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MENNONITE LIFE

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FRONT COVER:
Kaethe Kollwitz, "Death Seizes the Children." Courtesy Galerie, St. Etienne, N.Y.

BACK COVER:
Francisco Goya, "And there is no remedy" (From Disasters of War). Metropolitan Museum of Art, N.Y.

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IN THIS ISSUE

This winter it was decided to devote a number of convocations at Bethel College to Vietnam. After the papers were presented, it seemed advisable to devote an issue of *Mennonite Life* to this timely topic. A few other suitable articles were added. E. Stanley Bohn, Secretary for Peace and Social Concerns, and John F. Kauffman, senior at Bethel College, helped in a special way with the preparation of this issue. ¶ Alvin J. Beachy's sermon, "Called to be Faithful" was selected as an introduction while William Keeney's "Serving a Nation in Agony," relates some of the observations he made during his visit in Vietnam. Gene Stoltzfus presents personal experiences. ¶ The papers deal with the various aspects of a country in agony. What can we learn from the past in regard to the international conflicts of the present? What is the relationship between politics and morality? What price is being paid in an effort to "liberate" South Vietnam from the "invaders" from the North? What is the scientist's role in this and any other war? These are some of the questions which the various faculty members of Bethel wrestle with in their papers. Maynard Shelly made a thorough study of the press and its reporting about Vietnam. "Books in Review" is devoted primarily to publications dealing with Vietnam. ¶ Numerous questions in addition to those covered could have been raised in this issue. What is really the origin and the reason for the persistence of the struggle in this far-away country that was unknown to most of the inhabitants of our globe until recently? Is it caused by Western "imperialism?" Is it a struggle between representatives of Marxism and capitalism? Is it a part of the general awakening of underdeveloped nations who seek national freedom, social justice, and economic opportunities and now find that the lift the "big brother" was going to give them turned one country into an international battle ground? Could it be that if this were not in Vietnam it would be somewhere else? Could it be that a clash somewhere else could have been even worse? Most important of all, however, is the question; how can this growing and irritating explosive situation be brought to a close and how can similar eruptions in the future be prevented? ¶ Is it fair to say that Vietnam is merely a back yard fist fight between two giants who jealously watch each other in an unprecedented arms race? If these two giants get most of the blame for the situation that exists why don't they manage to stop this struggle and others that constantly threaten to cause global warfare and possible annihilation of a large part of mankind and most of our civilization? When will the intent and race for peace and preservation of the present civilization catch up and overtake the race in the production, display, and use of arms of destruction? If idealism and religious convictions are not strong enough to inspire this should not common sense and pure selfishness accomplish the task? Or is blindness leading to sure self destruction the strongest driving force of our age?

CALLED TO BE FAITHFUL

By Alvin J. Beachy

A sermon delivered at Zion Mennonite Church, Souderton, Pa., November 6, 1966.

THERE ARE REFLECTED in the writings of the New Testament two distinctly different attitudes toward the Roman Empire. In the letters of Paul, the earliest part of the New Testament to be written, the empire is pictured as the friend and protector of Christianity. In the book of Revelation the empire is the great enemy of the Christian faith. It is the anti-Christ, whom Christians are to resist, even unto death if need be, rather than to be obedient to it, as they were asked to be in Romans 13. The reason for the difference is not in the fickleness of Christians but in the demand of the empire that the emperor should be worshiped as divine—in short, that the nation as god should be identified with the God of all nations. This demand by the Roman empire cast John, the writer of Revelation, unavoidably in the role of a critic of the empire. I am sure that John did not seek out this role for the sake of criticism itself, and that he did not find it particularly enjoyable. Yet faithfulness to Jesus Christ as King of kings and Lord of lords did not allow John any other choice.

During this past year your pastor's own understanding of Christ's lordship of both the church and the world has frequently cast him in the role of a critic of our nation's Vietnam policy. It was not simply out of a love for dissent and criticism that I became a critic of the nation which I love, and to which I, like all the rest of you, owe a very great deal, indeed. It was rather out of a deep conviction that this nation, like all other nations, is a nation under that God, whose judgments are true and righteous altogether, that I felt compelled to speak out.

Every effort has been made by our government to present an unquestionable moral basis for our presence in Vietnam—the most often repeated one being that we are in South Vietnam at the request of a freely elected government in order to resist Communist aggression from North Vietnam.

Neil Sheehan shows the many ways in which that argument will not stand up in the light of the real facts. The time is too short to recite all the facts here, but one can summarize them in this way. The tragic war in Vietnam began as a war for independence from France and developed into a civil war because of its Communist leadership. As early as 1958 the South Vietnamese government under Diem, a government which was one of our creations, began with our assistance and connivance to make commando raids into North Vietnam. Neither side has ever recognized the 17th parallel as permanent, and both have violated it whenever it suited their convenience. We have built our government upon the base of the old colonial French government, which always exploited the peasants and was not really interested in much needed social reform. The Communists, on the other hand, have built upon the native Vietnamese desire for independence and for the need for social reform.

The end result, says Sheehan, is that our claim to have a moral basis for our presence in South Vietnam breaks down and becomes simply a part of the game of power politics in which the Vietnamese people are only pawns. He does not deny or defend the terrorist tactics of the Vietcong, who have killed an estimated 20,000 people by assassination in the past ten years. But Sheehan points out that our air strikes and our naval bombardments have in less than one year killed as many as perhaps 180 to 600 civilians in a single village—a village which was once a prosperous hamlet of 15,000 people, which has now been reduced to rubble. The refugees whom Sheehan was able to interview told him, "The Vietcong taxed us and they made

us work harder than we were accustomed to, but we could have lived with them. It was the American bombing raids which drove us from our homes." Currently, there are over one million refugees created by American bombing raids and the number still climbs daily. It has been variously estimated by different people in recent weeks that the rate of civilian to military casualties is anywhere from 6-10 to 1. One thinks of the two eight-year old boys in a hospital near DaNang horribly burned with napalm and of the troubled young American soldier, who spoke with such feeling to Atlee Beechy. The soldier was in the division of psychological warfare. The task of his division was to drop leaflets on villages that were on the list to be bombed two hours before the bombing was to take place. The leaflets told the villagers to gather together in a certain spot. Two hours in which to get together all your belongings and leave what has been home for a lifetime is not very long. But what troubled this young soldiers was that he knew many of the villagers could not even read! The young soldier said with feeling, "First we blow their houses to bits and then we bind up their wounds, but they remember better those who drop the bombs than those who put on the bandages."

Let no one deny that Communism is a very great evil. But equally, let us not succumb to the temptation to do evil that good may finally result from it. In God's world that will never happen. As Harry Emerson Fosdick once said, you cannot get to the right place by getting on the wrong bus—not in God's world. If God is the Lord of history, as I believe He is, as both Old and New Testaments say He is, we shall not escape His judgments for the cruelty and suffering we inflict upon others in theory for their freedom, but in actuality for the purpose of maintaining our own nation's political and economic supremacy in all of Southeast Asia.

Because your pastor was aware of the immense weight of suffering to these innocent people which our war laid upon the people of both North and South Vietnam, and the intense anguish which caused many American pilots to resign their commissions rather than to carry out their orders, he spared no efforts to reveal during the past year what most of the official press has sought to hide. I was concerned for young people who shall live in this world long after I am gone. I was concerned for the suffering of the innocent South Vietnamese people, and I was concerned for the cynicism which the high-sounding phrases with which we sold the war to the American public was developing in the American soldier, who was requested to fight it. Here are a few quotations from a few songs which have come right out of the battle zone. Here is one about the city-based staff advisor who often has little sympathy with the villagers whose hamlets are bombed as suspected Vietcong hide-outs:

His intelligence is six months old, his native wit is nill,
For him, the trees teem with VC and regiments crowd each hill.
He has no kinfolk in the woods, there's naught for him to lose,
So if in doubt he'll always shout, "Send in B-52's!"

And here is another one about the so-called forward observation plane, which flies over the village areas and directs artillery and bomb strikes:

The FAC rides forth to battle, a warrior without match,
In his monogrammed flak jacket and his F-100 patch.
Put napalm on a hamlet and burnt the whole thing flat,
Got a thousand noncombatants, and he's sorry about that.

What I feared last year was if the war continued to escalate, it would finally escalate into what might be described as the final barbarity of a second atomic bomb. It was my earnest hope and prayer that if enough people would speak out, public opinion might become strong enough to alter the mood in Washington and so the course of events. And I remembered, too, the statements of German Jews who survived the Nazi tyranny, that the worst thing they experienced was not the concentration camps but the awful silence of decent people. These hopes have not been realized. Although this is an election year, most candidates have

Chores at the front: Vietnamese polishing boots behind sand bags.

avoided the Vietnam conflict as politically too dangerous to be discussed, even though, as James Reston says, there are moral dimensions to the conflict which cry out for discussion. What the politician will not or perhaps cannot expose, the nature of unredeemed man being what it is, the church, it seems to me, must at least discuss, if not expose.

The Manila Conference is now history. More and more it appears as though fateful decisions were made there, which will make it less and less possible for the church to influence the course of events in the light of decisions that are made in the White House or in the Pentagon. The church then finds herself in a different situation than that which she found herself in a year ago, and that different situation, I believe, calls us to a different strategy for our witness to the world. Although the time has now passed when what the church says will make little difference in the way the United States shapes its Vietnam policy, the time has not come when we have ceased to have any control over the spirit that prevails in our own congregational life. Even though we may know that our witness has nothing more than a nuisance value, I hope that many of you will write letters to your congressmen and senators.

It would be my earnest hope that young men who are of draft age, who might not be conscientious objectors in some other war where the moral issues are more clear, would choose to be so in this present one, where the moral issues are so badly blurred or else completely absent. I would crave the opportunity to speak with you and your parents before you make your decision, if you are drafted or if you decide to enlist. But no matter what your decision might be, I should hold you in my heart as my brother in Christ. We have not taken the position which some do, that those who accept service in the Armed Forces thereby forfeit their membership in the church, and I do not think we should. We have here the more difficult task of developing a fellowship that is willing to embrace both the soldier in uniform and the C.O. in civilian dress as brothers in Christ. It is our hope that we can minister to both groups of men and their families.

Though the time has perhaps passed when by speaking out we can alter the course of this brutal and tragic war, the time need never come when we have no control over the spirit of brotherhood that prevails within the life of this congregation. We can, with the help of God, remain the reconciled and the reconciling community, even when the community of nations is the community in conflict. May we not fail in this our basic task, for it is now more urgent than at any other time. Let us not forget that Christ's first requirement for us is that we be faithful rather than successful. Perhaps if we can do no more, we can urge our government not to let the relief of the refugees we create alone to voluntary agencies, but ask that our tax burden be increased, so that we may lighten the load of the suffering. Norman Cousins in a recent issue of *The Saturday Review* has suggested as much. In any case, it is of utmost importance that in the midst of the present insanity of the community of nations, the church should retain her sanity as the community that is both formed and nourished by God's grace. Here when the tumult and the shouting dies and the bombs have stopped falling, let there be found that tree of life whose leaves are for the healing of all nations.

Meanwhile, here are some positive things we can do now. First, we can refuse to hate, knowing that every man is one who was created in the image of God and is, therefore, capable of being redeemed through Christ by the same God who created him. We can then refuse to accept the stereotype of every Communist as a "devil incarnate," and begin to see them as misguided human beings, who like ourselves can be redeemed by the power of the Gospel. Perhaps we can even enter into dialogue with them at the point of their professed and very often real concern for justice in social and economic life. For Christianity through its heritage from the Jewish prophets has that concern too, and in fact Marx and the Christian church borrowed that concern from the same source. Last but by no means least, we can pray that all men of goodwill, whatever their religious conviction or their political ideology, may learn to live together in peace, for we all inhabit the same planet, and we are all mortal.

I am deeply convinced that our involvement in Vietnam is deeply and tragically wrong. At the same time I am well aware that this position needs to be taken with a certain degree of healthy humility. The Old Testament prophets were never cocksure that God was in fact speaking through them. They always put their message on trial in this way. The Old Testament prophets would say, when the thing which we prophesied really comes to pass, then you will know that God has spoken through us and that we are not false prophets. But the prophets could not wait on history to prove that they were right. When the prophets were convinced that God spoke to them, the prophets spoke out. They cried out aloud, and they did not spare either priest or king, when God's message was one of judgment. Faithfulness to God required them to speak out, but it did not require the prophets to live on.

My own understanding of the Gospel, my own commitment to Jesus Christ, requires me to continue to speak out against our nation's Vietnam policy. I have no other choice in the light of my present understanding of both the Gospel and the real truth in the Vietnam conflict than to continue to oppose it in Christ's name. In faithfulness to Christ, that opposition must and will continue, though perhaps in more quiet ways than was previously the case.

SERVING A NATION IN AGONY

By William Keeney

No sensitive person can be acquainted with the situation in Vietnam and not be aware of the agony of the Vietnamese people. The details of agony are myriad. They can only be traced in broad outline and the more obvious are not always the worst.

Sources of the Agony

The physical suffering is the most obvious and in many ways the most dramatic. The news media carry repeated reports of the body count in battle. The constant repetition can make us calloused. Statistics are impersonal and the numbers do not recall the web of suffering that reaches beyond the cold statistics to fathers, mothers, wives, and children who grieve the loss.

The reporting also suggests that the only victims are combatants. No reliable figures report the deaths of civilians and no serious attempts are made to distinguish between combatants and civilians even in the body counts. In a guerrilla-type war the distinction is not always easy to make in any event. The estimates vary but they range from four to ten civilian deaths for every combatant. One missionary has estimated as high as two million Vietnamese killed in the conflict. Try to imagine that number in a nation whose total population is only seventeen million. This means about one person out of eight.

The suffering can be multiplied many times if the injured are added to the killed. The victims of napalm bombing are well publicized because the injuries are so horrible. Other types of injuries cause as much suffering and are more numerous. When we visited Vietnam in May of 1967 we went through some wards of a provincial hospital. In one ward we saw practically none but women and children who were victims of mortar fire. A young woman was brought in by her family and appeared to be in shock from several wounds. Many had lost an arm or leg. We talked through an interpreter to a man who had head and back wounds. He said he had been working in a field when a mortar shell landed nearby and fragments hit him.

The displacement of people is the result of a deliberate policy called search and destroy. One United States government official in charge of refugees in a district gave us a very chilling account of the program. The people of a village which has been under Viet Cong control for ten years or more are warned that they must leave the area. They are told to come out voluntarily. If they do not the soldiers move in with instructions to shoot anything that moves.

The people from the village are placed in camps. Only a few carefully screened persons may be permitted to return to the village and farm the land. Even they must return before dark each evening. Such people may be held for six to eight months in hopes that in time their loyalty to the Viet Cong will be broken. We asked what would happen to the houses in the village. The official replied that they would all suffer the usual ravages of vacancy in addition to those which would be destroyed or damaged in the search and destroy action. By such a process they hope to build loyalty to the South Vietnam Republic.

In May of 1967 government reports indicated that more than 1,800,000 refugees had been made in South Vietnam by the stepped up military action between January 1, 1964, and March 4, 1967. Of these over 300,000 were temporarily in camps and another 569,000 were outside of camps wherever they could squat. Almost 570,000 had been resettled somewhere else and only 310,000 had returned to their original village. Thus added to the one out of eight killed in the war, one out of ten is or has been a refugee.

The massive disruption of the country along with the presence of the foreign military is simply destroying the culture of the Vietnamese. The U.S. now has over a half million men in Vietnam. These men are paid high salaries compared to the Vietnamese. In addition, large amounts of money are spent by the United States government and quantities of goods and materials are imported. All of these people and their resources cannot help but have a heavy impact on the country.

The destruction of the culture and the society is as distressing and may in the long run be as disruptive of the country and as disastrous in its effect as the physical destruction. In downtown Saigon we saw many young men riding around or standing at the sidewalks with motor scooters. I thought they must be "Saigon cowboys." Instead we were told they are a form of taxi to shuttle American servicemen around as they look for entertainment. Such "taxis" are illegal. Nevertheless, the men who run them are mainly government workers. Because of the wartime inflation they cannot make ends meet without supplementing their income in illegal activity.

The government workers driving motor scooter taxis illustrate the way in which the values are being turned upside down. Formerly the teachers, lawmakers, and government workers were the most highly respected and best paid workers. Now it is the merchant, the hotel operators, the black marketeers, the bar girls and the prostitutes who make the most money.

It even corrupts the children. In Vietnam the best person is "number one"; the worst is "number ten." Young Vietnamese boys swarm around Americans asking for money. To an American a dime or a quarter is not much. But for the young Vietnamese it is a lot and easily leads them to become professional beggars. Even the American who does not want to make beggars has a hard time turning a deaf ear when he refuses and is called "number ten" by a small boy at his heels.

In towns where large numbers of Americans are stationed, the whole place may change rapidly. In one such overgrown village twenty new bars had sprung up in two years where only one had been. The Vietnam Christian Service workers would point to place after place and say that these were called "dens of iniquity" when they were in Sunday school.

Some workers who feel these effects keenly have expressed themselves in extreme statements. A Paxman said that he sometimes feels that we should bring "no more western techniques, no more western ideas, no more western nuts that do not fit Vietnamese wrenches." An International Voluntary Service official who was in the country from 1958 to September 1967 resigned to protest the American involvement. He said, "I am seeing the destruction of the people I love."

Montagnard refugees living under bamboo trees.

Refugees on the edge of village.

After a Ceremony, Ky and Freeman walking. (see p. 56).

(Center) Premier Ky. (Right) Orville Freeman who was invited to attend a Ceremony as the highest ranking American.

Knight on the White Charger

Two different approaches are used to seek a solution to the Vietnamese problems. Americans have a real sympathy for the underdog. Many have a generous impulse to help people in need. Most Americans also believe that if they bring enough power and resources to bear on any situation, they can solve it quickly.

A well-known television ad shows a white knight on a white charger ride into a dirty, messy kitchen. He touches the dirt and filth with his lance. Immediately all is turned white and bright and clean. Americans have gone into Vietnam hoping that by the touch of the lance, they could solve all the problems and make things white, bright and clean.

Ward Just, a reporter from *The Washington Post,* returned in the late spring of 1967 after about two years in Vietnam. He tried to determine just before he left what could be said certainly. He could not find much but he did report that everyone agreed that there was a sharp rise in mental illnesses among civilian employees of the American government in Vietnam. He said that no one knows the cause.

"Candid Camera" had a parody of the Knight on the White Charger. One of their staff men stood on a corner or at a service station and talked with a bystander. All of a sudden a white knight on a charger would come around the corner and down the street. As he rode toward the pair, the bystander would usually say something, such as, "Look! Here comes the white knight. He is going to make everything white and clean." But as the knight rode by them, he touched them with a lance and it squirted a black liquid on them. Then as he rode off and wheeled around, the bystander would say, "Oh! He is going to come back and clean it up now." When he rode by, again he touched them with the lance and once more squirted black liquid on them.

Is it not possible that this parody explains the mental illness of the civilian employees? They come with real desire and expectation that they will be the Knight on the White Charger to set the nasty, dirty situation right. Instead, as the American lance touches the situation it gets worse and worse. Almost every voluntary agency person, whether church- or nonchurch-related, whom we talked to in Vietnam agreed that the military activity was creating more problems than it was solving. The problems were essentially social, economic and political and so not subject to military solution.

Even the so-called "other war," the pacification program, was not very successful. Linking it with a military program puts it in the wrong perspective. A Methodist who has spent most of his life as an agriculturalist working on community development could get very upset about the American pacification program. He charged it with seeking results in terms of miles when it can only come in inches. He further pointed out that you cannot bring community devevopment at the point of the gun.

Some very recent reports indicate a growing anti-American feeling among Vietnamese. One voluntary agency official who spent several years in Vietnam and spoke the language said that he could note this development both in the city and in the rural areas. When he tried to investigate needs in a village in the Mekong Delta, he tried to speak to five women. All turned and went indoors. The sixth would answer his inquiries only because he first gained the interest of her child. This reaction is not typical of the rural Vietnamese and only started recently. So the Knight on the White Charger who goes as "number one" suddenly finds himself "number ten" in the eyes of those whom he hoped to help.

The Service of the Church

The church is not absent from the land of agony. It is true that the Christian and Missionary Alliance (C&MA) has carried on the only major evangelistic work by Protestants. This work has developed into a

church of 40,000 in slightly more than fifty years. This church calls itself *Tin Lahn* which means "Good News" in Vietnamese. In English it is usually referred to as the Evangelical Church.

In 1954 the Mennonite Central Committee entered Vietnam to undertake a service program. The work was done in close cooperation with the Evangelical Church. The program which was developed in the first ten years put the MCC in a unique position to be of larger service to the Protestant Churches from America.

In 1964 the United States began to increase military participation in the conflict. Its involvement moved from a few hundred advisors to several hundred thousand troops in a rather short period of time and now constitutes about a half million. The search and destroy tactics began to create the high numbers of refugees very rapidly, as described already.

The churches of America were moved by the reports of the growing suffering of the Vietnamese people and wanted to offer aid to them. Church World Service (CWS) is the relief and service agency of the National Council of Churches. CWS by policy tries to work closely with the national Protestant churches in any country where CWS operates. Since MCC already had a warm relationship to the Vietnamese church and had its confidence, CWS and Lutheran World Relief joined the MCC in setting up Vietnam Christian Service (VNCS). A simple, one-page agreement committed the three to pool finances, materials and personnel and have the MCC administer the program. Any partner may terminate the relationship at the end of any year.

The MCC also works closely with World Relief Service, the agency of the National Evangelical Association. When we visited Vietnam in May, 1967, all the personnel at the Agricultural Training Unit in Hué were seconded to the program by VNCS, with most of them coming through MCC. Thus the MCC served a wide range of churches in the ministry of love to the Vietnamese.

The program of Vietnam Christian Service covers a wide variety of social, economic and physical needs of the Vietnamese. At Nhatrang and Pleiku hospitals and clinics are operated in cooperation with the Evangelical Church. Medical work of different types is done at several other locations. Refugee work is done at several locations and constitutes a major part of the program expansion since MCC was joined by other partners. In some places it has emergency food and clothing distributions. At other places it may include longer range social services, such as retraining people for new jobs. In some places it means bringing new skills. In some areas the tribal people follow the "slash and burn" method of farming. The jungle is cut down and a space burned to clear it. It is farmed for a few years until the soil is depleted. Then they move on. It is not a very good method any time and now with security problems almost impossible. So new and improved methods are taught and demonstrated.

In some cities educational and social work is included. A young man is affiliated with a technical training institute as an assistant. An architect plans new buildings both for VNCS and the government. Family aid is given to needy families as attempts are made to help them get started anew after being dislocated.

VNCS had a total of eighty-seven western staff people in Vietnam in 1967. Slightly more than one-half, forty-five, were sponsored by MCC. In addition, fifty-three Vietnamese workers are regular members of the staff. The hospital boards at Nhatrang and Pleiku have twenty-six persons employed and might be considered part of the total staff. VNCS distributed various kinds of materials totaling 2,955,000 pounds valued at $352,000 in the program during 1967. The total budget was just over $400,000 with CWS providing about $250,00, LWS about $70,000 and the MCC about the same amount as LWS.

The National Evangelical Church has not had a history of service programs such as those carried on by MCC and VNCS. A leading pastor in the Evangelical Church told us that the work of MCC is highly appreciated by the Vietnamese Christians. He said that work such as in the hospitals at Nhatrang and Pleiku had shown them that men could be saved for Christ by such deeds also. The ministry of deeds proclaims the Gospel in ways which words alone cannot.

The program in Vietnam is primarily a person to person program. It does not have the vast resources which the United States government invests in materials and personnel. The impact of the program has to be centered in competent people who add the extra Christian concern in using their resources.

The Agony of the Church

The church is in a land of agony. To be able to minister to these people and relieve some of the suffering and hurt is a privilege for which the workers are grateful. It is not, however, without agony for the workers themselves. They must at times ask whether they are not by their presence and service being compromised and contributing to the destruction of the people whom they love and want to serve.

In a nation at war you must depend on the military for many of the essentials so that you can work. Transportation on the ground is almost impossible because of the breakdown in security. When we were in Vietnam in May, 1967, it was worse than when the United States increased involvement began in 1964, and seemed to be getting even worse. To move personnel and materials about under such conditions you must depend on the military. Some Quakers try to avoid dependence by refusing to use the military couriers or even Air America, a privately operated but U.S. government subsidized airline. But they reduce their program to the

use of persons and very little use of any materials and move them by the Vietnamese airline. They acknowledge that Air America is probably no more subsidized by the United States government than the Vietnamese airline.

Permission to operate and to have housing and storage facilities also depends on the military. Just to exist and operate means dependence on the military. In general the units follow the security regulations set up by the military. This means that the activity of VNCS is largely restricted to areas controlled by the U. S. and South Vietnamese forces. While MCC continues to try to follow the long-established policy of giving aid without regard to the race, creed or political affiliation, but only on the basis of need, its services reach only on one side of the conflict.

The difficulty of maintaining a separate identity from the military pacification program is difficult and leads some to ask whether the ministry in the name of Christ may be too easily misconstrued. Even more difficult is the nagging suspicion that the program is only making a military policy easier to pursue without questions of conscience being raised. When the U. S. military began its search and destroy policy, it knew that it would make refugees in large numbers. By caring for the refugees VNCS may be salving the conscience of the policy makers. If the plight of the refugees stood out in its starkest tragedy, world opinion might bring the U. S. to modify or discontinue its inhumane practice.

Pressures of subtle forms are always being exerted to use the VNCS as part of the effort for military and political victory. Location of programs, types of services, interpretation of the benefits as being American can all be fitted into the military and political purposes in the conflict. Less subtle pressures are used if Christian convictions about the war are shared. The government officials may attempt to get rid of certain workers or hamper the work by reducing priorities on transportation, materials, housing or permission to do certain things.

The VNCS leadership is very much aware of the threats to independence and integrity. So they agonize about withdrawing to protest the horrible consequences of a war which undoes much of what they do or believe should happen. In September, 1967, four top officials of International Voluntary Service resigned in protest. Two of these were Mennonites. Certainly this sharpened the agony of all sensitive to the war and its effects.

The decision to stay comes from the compassionate agony shared with those who continue to suffer. The workers still judge that their efforts are effective and to withdraw would hurt most those they are trying to help. Enough independence can be maintained and their integrity can still be preserved so that they should continue.

In one city two workers went to start a new VNCS program. For the first two months they were viewed with suspicion, spit upon and stones were cast at them because the people thought they were CIA agents. They persevered and tried to show trust and mercy to any who would let the workers trust them. As they made friends, they moved about with more and more freedom. After two months they felt they had established their identity as different from the CIA. No one spat at them or threw stones at them any longer.

At another location the workers could have moved inside a military compound when periodical mortaring fell in the village and destroyed houses near where they lived. Or they could have withdrawn completely as some other private agency people had done. Instead they made a bunker so that they would only be endangered if a direct hit landed on them. They felt it would only be an accident since they were not the object of attack. So they chose to share the same risk of the villagers to be able to continue to serve them and the refugees in the area.

The workers also have other reasons for staying. The MCC has established a relationship of confidence and trust with the Evangelical Church. They are working in partnership on some projects. The national church is not yet able to take over and operate these programs on its own. Given time it is hoped that the church could take over these responsibilities. To leave now would harm the relationship and it might not be possible to pick up the pieces at a later time.

Some have urged the church to stay for another reason. Compassionate observers are needed to report the agony. The credibility gap is not without reason. The Christian workers who are close to the Vietnamese people can help keep us aware of the true situation.

The workers do feel that the decisions to seek solution to the Vietnamese problems are affected more in the United States than in Vietnam. The military is creating more problems than it is solving. The problems are basically social, economic and political. The continued escalation of military action delays, prevents or even destroys the solutions at the other levels. The workers urge that this be communicated to the leaders of government who make the decisions about military policies.

Regardless of how soon the military action stops, the agony of Vietnam will continue for a long time to come. No solution to the needs will come quickly. Many causes of the agony, even though compounded by the war, were there before and will not disappear easily. The peace that is so desperately needed would only allow more opportunity for attack on these problems.

In the midst of the agony of a nation, even in the agony of the Christians whose resources may seem petty in contrast to those of the military, the power of love is at work. It is the faith of the church that only that which is done in love endures. If this is true, then the most important sign in Vietnam is not the lance of the white knight but the cup of cold water given in the name of Christ.

THE CHRISTIAN DILEMMA: THE POLITICS OF MORALITY

By Harold H. Gross

WHILE I VIEW the Vietnam situation especially from the standpoint of Christian morality, I wish to pay due homage to many fellow Americans who, on moral grounds other than those specifically of the Christian faith, find themselves in a similarly unhappy plight.

It certainly cannot be part of my purpose here to attempt to outline in any detail what I might consider to be a viable Christian attitude toward warfare and the military establishment. It should go almost without saying that Christian moral behavior issues forth in the life of a serious Christian as a dynamic response to the love of God as we are confronted by it concretely in the form of the authentic humanity of Jesus Christ. There are, to be sure, problems attendant to any interpretation of the literary records which report the inherent character of this Christ event within which God's word of redemption and life is presented to man, just as there are questions as to how the reality of God's love should find expression within the uniqueness of each Christian's personal experience and situation in life. It seems to me, however, that there can be no question about the absolute or categorical nature of the claim which God's agape in Christ makes upon the person who takes the step of serious Christian commitment. I believe that this commitment must, in its very nature, and for all purposes, be by intention an unreserved one, minus any semblance of planned compromise. It is one thing to recognize compromise as an unavoidable outcome of our finiteness as human creatures; it is quite another matter, from the Christian standpoint, to turn compromise into a sort of general principle designed by original intention for the constructing of a prudential or calculative ethic, which I have more than a suspicion is the *modus operandi* of many professing Christians.

While I have come to avoid identifying my own position by the rather ambiguous label "Christian pacifism," the prevalent usage of the term has at least the merit of suggesting the absolute nature of the divine claim upon which the Christian commitment is based. And it is with this in mind that I can do no better than to quote the words of a nonpacifist contemporary New Testament scholar, John Knox, writing on "Re-examining Pacifism." He says, "Pacifism is the most obvious Christian position, and any denial of it must carry the burden of proof."[1] Knox admits to being "warmly sympathetic with the pacifist"[2] and to agreeing with him to a considerable extent. His underlying criticism seems to have to do with the tendency on the part of many to regard Christian pacifism "as a possible political strategy."[3]

Knox's position has been similar to that of many another non-pacifist Christian, including perhaps the most renowned of them, Reinhold Niebuhr.* While conceding the "relevance of the ideal of love to the moral experience of mankind on every conceivable level,"[4] and that "it is very foolish to deny that the ethic of Jesus is an absolute and uncompromising ethic,"[5] he decries the tendency of some Christian theologians "to become involved in the relativities of politics" and thereby tending "to reduce the ethic so that it will cover and justify our prudential and relative standards and strategies."[6] Niebuhr even makes reference to what he calls "Protestant sectarian perfectionism (of the type of Menno Simons, for instance) where the effort to achieve a standard of perfect love in individual life was not presented as a political alternative."[7] I have some reason to wonder, from a personal academic encounter with him in 1949, how thorough a knowledge Niebuhr has of Mennonite history and thought, and whether his language used in identifying Menno Simons as a perfectionist who sought to "achieve a standard of perfect love in individual life" avoids implying a legalistically-inclined ethic. However, unquestionably he is right in suggesting that Menno (like himself) did not confusedly identify a life lived under the absolute moral claims of the Gospel with political relativities.

But, it appears to me, this points precisely to the predicament which we as Christians face today, and which I shall refer to in terms of the "politics of morality": Just how do we as Christians meet, in any sense of adequacy, the absolute claims of Christ on our lives as citizens who live within political systems whose structural relativities, whose principles of action and claims of patriotic duty have in practice become formally identified with what is called "Christianity"—such that the nation embodied within such a political system can carry on what amounts to the claim of a holy war in a far-off country? What unfortunately feeds the emotional flames of this holy war is the naive identification of Communism with atheism.

We are quite familiar with the problems connected with what is commonly called the "morality of politics,"

where in our own national capitol congressional "committees on ethics" investigate the political practices of individual congressmen—even to the point where such men are censured by Congress itself. It is not difficult to discover that among the "games people play" the game called "the morality of politics" can be one of the most fascinating. Not that there are not genuinely moral considerations entailed by the acts of individual politicians—for there are, and they deserve critical consideration! But please forgive me if I express the more than faint suspicion that the "morality of politics" game can also serve the function of being a distraction from concern with fundamental moral issues for which there are no codes of congressional ethics to go by, and in which whole congressional bodies can become implicated!

Perhaps Eric Berne makes the point clearer in his popular book, when he indicates that "games people play" can have many functions—among them being the avoidance of confrontation with reality, the concealing of ulterior motives, or even the avoidance of actual participation in human affairs. There is plenty of evidence that the "morality of politics" game is played very skillfuly even within the confines of the church, as is suggested in the title of a humorously serious book published sometime ago by a clergyman which bore the title *How to Become a Bishop Without Being Religious*. I strongly suspect that T. V. Smith, the philosopher and sometime dabbler in politics, had observed the playing of the "morality of politics" game among Christians when with appropriate irony he wrote: "Conscience crucifies conscience on the cross of presumption unless the saints are protected from one another by political sinners who arrange the compromises of conscience and thus constitute the law which private citizens can agree to call 'the public conscience'."[8] One could go on observing "morality of politics" games if time were available.

However, I have made this excursion into the world of "morality games" primarily to point up the issue with which I am mainly concerned here. I am suggesting, of course, that morality is not really merely a game to be played—especially not Christian morality. Games are played according to rules, and Christian morality is no mere matter of rules. I am here rather more concerned with what I shall call the "politics of morality" than with the "morality of politics." This distinction is crucial, since in the "morality of politics" moral-sounding language (the moralistic cliche) is used as a ploy for the purpose of promoting political ends; while in the "politics of morality," politics becomes a means of achieving moral ends.

John Hollowell, a political scientist (and a Christian) reminds us that there is a long tradition, dating back to Plato and Aristotle (who laid the foundations of Western political science) in which "politics was conceived as the application of ethical principles to social problems." And politics, in this great tradition, "aims at the reconciliation of conflicting interests and . . . is dependent upon the existence of certain principles in terms of which reconciliation may take place." What is especially important in Hollowell's emphasis is that "the principles in terms of which the reconciliation of conflicting individual purposes may take place are dependent upon the conceptions which we hold concerning the nature and destiny of man. For in order to answer the question: what is good for men?, what is in the best interest of human beings?, we must first answer the question: what is man?, what ought he to be (become)?"[9] Thus, the great tradition in political thought which helped give shape to Western civilization is rooted in moral considerations, since it is concerned with man as a moral being and with what man ought to become and, consequently, with what man dare do to man. Considering the preoccupation of the Christian faith with what man ought to be like, it is hardly to be wondered at that the great confluence of the Graeco-Roman and the Judaic-Christian traditions produced the great democratic and political ideals, which we so much idolize but practice so little.

American politics has indeed become such an end in itself that it is hardly recognizable as an instrument for ordering human relations and interests to the end of reconciliation and the resolving of conflicts. It has lost its function as the servant of moral principle and has become so greatly severed from morality (and to that degree, remember, from man and concern for his welfare and destiny!) that I doubt that *fundamental* moral issues are hardly ever dealt with in discussions concerning our Vietnam foreign policy except in terms of the trite manipulation of cliches and moralisms. The glaring light of moral reality would be too devastating to military and political prejudices.

I must consider the declaration of a certain newspaper editorial writer to be profoundly unpatriotic and immoral, since it severs the very roots of our body politic from its moral heritage. He wrote that "perhaps the question is not so much whether what the United States IS doing about Vietnam is right or wrong, but rather what the United States CAN do about Vietnam."[10] This is as blatant a denial of the relevance of moral considerations as one can find. If this view is as widely held as I believe it is, a large segment of the American public should be ready to define politics simply as the art of expediency! At first even the White House appears to manifest a kind of highly moral cosmic piety in reaffirming what it magnanimously calls "our commitments to the rest of the world." But then it adds, with a disquieting note of self-interest, that what we do is done "in what we consider the best interests of the United States."[11] The crucial question, of course, has to do with just how those noble commitments to others might be affected by our politically expedient "best interests" to ourselves. Morality, it

In the background is the roof which was built first under which refugees are living until the rest of the house is completed.

seems, is something we subscribe to and concerning which we have conscientious scruples primarily when it serves our expedient need or our abstractly but piously stated purpose! If daily news reports are at all reliable in reflecting the manner in which our foreign policy has been operating, with reference to Vietnam in particular, we are engaging in a kind of Machiavellian "morality of politics" game called "Guess Who's the Aggressor Now!" in which our favorite play involves the role of "the pot calling the kettle black." Moreover, where the "politics of morality" are concerned, our government's policy might at best be given the old psychiatric label, "schizoid"— in which condition the political character-structure of our country is radically split off from moral reality. And please remember, this is happening in a nation which likes to call itself a "Christian nation."

This suggests a problem which should be of basic concern to Christians who have not lost sight of the fact that the Christian Faith and the American flag do not stand in a one-to-one symbolic relationship, and that the Christian church is not identical with American culture. How can the church, or rather how can Christ through the church activate the politics of morality—the Christian morality in which our great country was nurtured—in such a way that it will once again come to be realized that political institutions exist only in order to enable a moral being, called man, to realize his full humanity—in the United States, in Vietnam, and wherever there are human beings! Evidently, however, it is even difficult for God to get through on the "hot line" to the White House. The Christian's dilemma in the United States today, involving the absence of a vitally functioning "politics

Making the coffin lid. The metal roof will be placed over the grave.

Montagnard refugee thatching a roof.

of morality," can be seen when we view the Vietnam debacle as a paradigm of the pathology of communications breakdown which characterizes the relationship between morally sensitive American citizens and that consensual pontificate in Washington upon whose presumed omniscience even our congressional delegates are apparently prone to depend. A matter of moral principle cannot be determined by consensus. And yet the fact seems to be that morality by consensus is the "politics" by means of which witness to anything like a moral issue is entertained by our government—when it is entertained! It is unfortunate to the point of becoming potentially tragic when the inhabitant of the presidential office of this great nation lends himself to a kind of sanctimonious insularity to the radically moral aspects of political decision-making. Yet there are reasons for believing that Lyndon Baines Johnson might, in effect, be saying that "I just know in my heart that it is not right to listen to dissenters from our Vietnam policy"—just as he "knew in his heart" that "it was not right for Dick Nixon to become President" in 1964.

Admittedly, I am longer on questions than I am on answers with reference to this problem of communications breakdown within the governmental structures of what we like to call our democracy. My hope, I must confess, does not rest in Americans in my own middle-age group and older--whose moral sensitivities have been dulled, and whose minds are suffering from that usually fatal disease which, for want of a better name, can appropriately be called "hardening of the categories." The thought processes of an increasing number of middle-class Americans seem to be suffering from calcification of the imagination, from a premature senility of the intellect and the spiritual deterioration which usually accompanies it. Unless some intervening sensitizing moral agent changes the character of the dominant value-systems by which our American thought

A Vietnamese soldier on guard. The bridge is guarded day and night.

processes are shaped, and by which a fresh and aesthetically imaginative leadership might be informed, we are doomed! Our hope is in youth in the church, in the colleges and elsewhere who have the kind of aesthetic and moral sensitivity which I see in our present college generation—a sensitivity to those values which enable human beings to become truly human. Only American "squares" with a distorted notion of what they call 'freedom' (and who do not see that many youth are being immorally manipulated by military indoctrination with its imposed sense of destructive disvalues) cannot see that human freedom always functions within those limits which are determined by the value one places on human beings anywhere and everywhere. While we piously deplore aggression in our streets at home, with demonic impiety we train for aggression in Southeast Asia! The military establishment wants to train men as young as possible, since it knows that the younger they come the easier it is to indoctrinate them with values of the military system. Surely it is no exaggeration to say that the moral character of a nation is largely described by the sense of values to which its people are committed. Our capacity for exercise of personal freedom, within which the character of our preferences and decisions are determined, is contingent upon the sense of those values which have become part of our character structure early in life.

Now really, does anyone with a modicum of moral sensibility believe that the system of values and the habitual emotional responses which are induced by military training into what the system calls a "malleable" recruit, really inculcates healthy personal freedom? Americans are rightfully alarmed at the increase in crime and gangsterism in our cities. And it is obvious that citizens are eager to play the "morality game" of pressing for censorship and legislation to control such ill-defined symptoms as "obscenity" and "pornography." But, is our American sense of values so distorted (or perverted) as not to discern that this training for barbarous warfare in Vietnam is in itself a training for obscenity and pornography of the worst sort? Is the American value base for discriminating between what is moral and immoral so limited to a morbid preoccupation with sex that it is blinded to the fact that our military actions in Vietnam come under any adequate dictionary definition of obscenity or pornography?

One thing, at least, seems quite clear to me: the coming generations of American leaders (and followers!) must learn to meet domestic and international problems and human needs with greater sensitivity and imagination than the present-day leadership is doing. And, moreover, I believe that I detect in increasing numbers of our youth today genuine signs of the kind of ethical sensitivity which is needed by the Church and by our American society if a revitalized politics of a newly sensitized morality is to give us the kind of leadership and followership which will prevent other Vietnams.

FOOTNOTES

1. John Knox, (ed.) *Religion and the Present Crisis*, University of Chicago Press, (1942) p. 34.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
*It should be added here that while he was unquestionably anti-pacifist during World War II, he has been one of the staunchest critics of the action of the United States in Vietnam.
4. Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, Harper and Brothers, (1935) p. 114.
5. Heinhold Niebuhr, *Christianity and Power Politics*, Charles Scribner's Sons, (1940) p. 8.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
8. T. V. Smith, *The Ethics of Compromise*, Starr King Press (1956) p. 70.
9. J. H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Political Thought*, Henry Holt and Company, (1950) p. 6.
10. Newspaper Enterprise Association editorial, *Newton Kansan*, November 12 (1966).
11. Reported by Bruce Biossat, Newspaper Enterprise Association, *Newton Kansan*, November 22, 1967.
12. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1967.

LEARNING THE WRONG LESSONS

By Keith L. Sprunger

One of the most notorious events of our century was the appeasement at Munich in September of 1938, when Britain and France agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenland was handed over to Hitler in an effort to prevent a European war. It has become a commonplace to decry the shame of Munich. Munich stands for appeasement. The ingredients of appeasement are simple: an aggressive fascist dictator—although any dictator will do—expanding at the expense of his weaker neighbors and a weak-kneed statesman or two, usually running around with an umbrella, who look on idly and make no stand against the aggressor.

When Neville Chamberlain returned to London from Munich, he affirmed his confidence that Hitler "was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word." Yes, the deal had been made and agreed to; Britain would not go to war for Czechoslovakia and for a "quarrel in a far-away country between peoples of whom we know nothing." "I believe it is peace for our time," Chamberlain said. He was an English hero for having appeased Hitler and clearing away the major grievances standing in the way of peace. F. D. Roosevelt with characteristic buoyancy sent a transatlantic slap upon the back: "Good man." Within the year, World War II had begun.

What the logic of Munich was is not precisely clear. Most people assume that Chamberlain was simply naive and that he was outwitted and bullied by Hitler. Perhaps. Others, more cynical, believe that Chamberlain had a deeper scheme of using Hitler in an anti-communist drive against Stalin, hoping to see the two dictators kill each other off or, at the least, to see Communism obliterated. This would have left England as top nation, which, as every student of English history knows, would have been a "good thing." These questions we will leave to the historians and to the historical journals.

Rather, what has Munich come to mean to us? What lessons have we learned from this episode of history? In the popular mind appeasement and Munich are emotion-laden words standing for wickedness and weakness. Appeasement is when you do not stop your opponent at the first chance; he goes on and on in his aggressive crime; and aggressors are never satisfied. Finally you have to take a belated stand for the right and the holocaust comes.

Some unforgettable lessons were learned at Munich. Don't bargain with enemies, dictators, and aggressors. Stop them dead. Never negotiate or compromise (especially with Communists, who substitute for Fascism as the great evil today). Force is the only language the enemy will understand. Harold Macmillan in his recent memoirs is to the point; "Alas! the Peace of Munich was both dishonourable and short."[1] Churchill has specialized in fervent denunciations of appeasement. "A melancholy lapse from which flowed terrible consequences," he has described Munich; "a fatal course."[2]

Now we are being told that Vietnam is another Munich—another test—and that this is what the war is about. The Munich analogy has been dragged in to justify the war. It seems that Ho Chi Minh and China are in the midst of aggression; we dare not make the same mistakes of compromise and conversation that were made at Munich. President Johnson uses this analogy of Munich and Vietnam to explain why the people of Vietnam must die. In his speech of July 28, 1965: "If we are driven from the field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promises or in American protection." "We learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another, bringing with it perhaps ever larger and crueler conflict. . . ."[3]

Secretary Rusk has been equally diligent in doing his history homework. "I'm not the village idiot," he explained. "I know Hitler was an Austrian and Mao is Chinese. . . . But what is common between the two situations is the phenomenon of aggression." Increasingly China is made the primary enemy; North Vietnam, the tool. As Rusk put it, "It is Ho Chi Minh's war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's war."[4] (Now we have twin Hitlers.) In the recent Vietnam Dialogue (November 8, 1967) sponsored by the Newton Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Colonel Thomas Badger made much the same point of the parallel between Munich and Vietnam; both Ho and Hitler were expansionists, he pointed out.

The reasons are obvious. If Vietnam can be made into another Munich and negotiation into appeasement, then the hawks have won the debate. Once a situation has been labelled appeasement, no further discussion is in order—just drop the bombs. Everybody knows that appeasement is a bad thing; this is a lesson we

learned from history. Ironically, the analogy of Vietnam and Munich is so good that it is being used in China: the only difference is that the Chinese believe that they are standing up to American aggression. Bad history seems to work both ways.

Walter Lippmann has made some comments about the Johnson administration and its learning the wrong lessons too well. Speaking of Dean Rusk, "Rusk is a very sincere man whose education stopped about 1944." Nothing about the revolutionary nature of the world seems to sink in; "it's still the same old thing applied to the original Second World War concepts. And those concepts—namely, that you fight aggression, and if you win the battle, then you have peace, eternal peace . . . that all was invented in the First World War. Cordell Hull learned it there, from Woodrow Wilson, and it was passed on to Dean Rusk and to President Johnson, who have accepted it as if it were the eternal truth, that you fight wars against aggression and thereby end war."[5]

All historical analogies have their strengths and weaknesses. Historians, in fact, are cautious of claiming very much for the use of analogies (except for their own pet analogy). The Munich, appeasement, and Vietnam analogy, however, is worse than most. It simply won't do. The analogy—aggressive dictator attacking surrounding states while the appeasers, Daladier and Chamberlain, stand cowardly by permitting the carnage—has three major weaknesses.

First, the Vietnam war is a civil war among Vietnamese, not a war of aggression by outside forces. The major outside force in Vietnam is the American army. That this is a civil war makes impossible any meaningful comparison between Vietnam and the Europe of the 1930's. Senator Fulbright has recently made this same point. "This was not a case of aggression, as we have been led to believe, but rather a civil war between two factions of Vietnamese."[6] The existence of two states, north and south Vietnam, is the result of outside manipulation. The two Vietnams have been historcially one country and were meant to be one country except for the politics of the Cold War. The Viet Cong is not primarily an outside force; it is largely composed of local rebels who have no faith in the Saigon government. The north has become involved (essentially a part of the same country), but mainly in response to intervention by American force. Escalation has been met by escalation.

What we see in Vietnam is an amorphous, fluid situation of a state in the process of trying to be born, not two well established states at war with one another. General Ky comes from the north although he now

Instruments of destruction are found in all fields, roads, hamlets, and cities.

presumes to speak for the south; important officials in Hanoi are from the south.[7] There are no firmly established lines of battle. The local population apparently can see little evidence of outrageous aggression, for they more often than not are passive about the conduct of the war. Why is it, Arthur Miller asked recently, that it is always Americans burning villages and uprooting the population rather than the Vietnamese themselves scorching the earth and carrying on the struggle? "It can only mean that they don't share our urgency. . . . In short, it is our war against Hanoi and not the war of the people of Vietnam against the Viet Cong."[8] Miller is no expert on southeast Asia, but he can speak common sense. Many observers have noted that Ho Chi Minh is very popular throughout Vietnam; in fact national elections had to be prevented during the 1950's in knowledge that Ho would sweep everything before him. Former President Eisenhower conceded in his memoirs that had free elections been held, "possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader. . . ."[9] Ho makes a strange Hitler.

And so the war goes on, the American army fighting a crusade to destroy Communism and aggression with the local population looking on in bewilderment. Always before, aggression has been recognized by those closest at hand. The confusion of local apathy and the lack of clearcut battle lines must surely be puzzling to the Pentagon which continues to refight World War II and Munich. "We are making great progress in Vietnam," General Omar Bradley reports, "but the problem is that we have no solid line for measuring progress as we did in World War II." That precisely is the point. Vietnam is not World War II nor even Korea; this is a different kind of war. It makes little sense to compare an internal struggle in a partioned country to a Hitler marching across well established national boundaries to overwhelm an entirely distinct people.

Second, Asia is not Europe. This is obvious; but let's make the point. There are in Asia few stable, well-defined states to protect, nor are there many states that want to be saved by intervention of American armies. Saving Vietnam from Communism will probably not prevent the same kind of guerrilla warfare from breaking out in still other of the unstable countries of southeast Asia. In the Europe of the thirties there was something to save from Hitler and people that wanted to be saved. There were relatively well established national states that knew who their enemy was. Who knows whether the domino theory means anything or not?

Aggression in Korea was met with force.[10] But Korea did not prevent war in Vietnam nor uprising in Cuba and a dozen other places. Where is the validity of the domino theory? Regardless of what happens in Vietnam, it will not prevent revolutionary guerrilla wars from erupting in Thailand, Malaya, or the Philippines. The future of those countries will be determined by what happens in those countries, not by some line of dominoes crashing in upon them.[11] These nationalistic, social wars arise out of local conditions, not from some great cosmic forces of evil. As Lippmann says, "Well, now, look at the record. This is the third war against aggression we've fought, within even your lifetime."[12]

The factor of race further reminds us that Asia is not Europe. The white man's day in Asia is over—the burden has been lifted. Vietnam has become the white man's war against the Asian. The American army cannot easily identify with local aspirations. Almost automatically, a western army will be labelled by Asians as an aggressor. Coming in to save people from aggression *ipso facto* became aggression itself.

A third weakness in the Vietnam-Munich analogy stems from an insufficient understanding of the nature of communism in Asia. Communism, identifying itself with nationalistic, racial, and local ideals, is not necessarily regarded as an evil. Communism has a nearly irresistible appeal in Asia and Africa whenever it adopts the rhetoric of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and reform. Barbara Ward observes that communism can speak to the burning issues of the developing country. "It is to the mood of psychological frustration that communism can speak."[13] No one here is denying that the Viet Cong and North Vietnam are communist. The question is, may the people of Vietnam be communists if this is what they choose? Asians sometimes choose communism by design, not necessarily through aggression.

In the Munich- Vietnam analogy fascism and communism are put together as the same kind of destructive, ruinous ideologies. This is more superficial than contributory to understanding. Both ideologies do involve dictatorship, but with this difference. The ideals of fascism with its racism, militarism, and repression, are wholly destructive of human community and human values. Communism, although unpleasant in many of its manifestations, has been able to point to larger ideals of racial equality, brotherhood, social justice, and reform, all of which are passionately sought after in developing countries. Communism has its appeal. Of course, these transcendent ideals of communism have often been denied in practice, but it must be recognized that these ideals make an impact and adapt themselves well to the anti-western, anti-colonial attitudes of Asian countries. We too of the West often fail to live up to our transcendent ideals. As Howard Zinn writes, "We judge ourselves by our ideals, others by their actions. It is a great convenience."[14]

What is socialism? It means quite a different thing to an affluent American than it does to an impoverished Vietnamese. Émile Durkheim, lecturing to his classes at Bordeaux summed up the spirit of socialism; to him it "is not a science, a sociology in miniature; it is a cry of pain."[15] Here is the beginning of wisdom for understanding revolution, socialism, and communism

in Asia—the cry of pain to which social revolution seems to speak as well or better than most other possibilities.

Is the nature of the revolutionary movement today comprehended in the Pentagon and in the White House? I think not. The assumptions of our foreign policy polarize everything into a great and eternal struggle between good and evil, Communism and the free world. Schlesinger is not terribly kind but perhaps right when he says, "The President of the United States can hardly understand the eastern seaboard of his own country; why in the world does he think he can understand the eastern seaboard of Asia?"[16]

Unfortunately, we seldom draw out from history great, clearcut, cosmic, and eternal lessons; and when we do, we likely will be learning the wrong lessons, as when we derive faulty analogies about Munich. It turns out that we cannot tell the difference between a civil war with largely local interests and world aggression. We overreact against all change. We develop a speciality of bombing people back into the stone age. And then we sanctify the entire operation by pious appeals to history. True, General Ky is said to have named Adolf Hitler as his hero; and Ky is on our side. That does not quite fit the analogy, does it? Never underestimate American ingenuity.

Historians are cautious about extravagant claims on behalf of the predictive powers of history. Insights can be gained about the present, but there is always the very real possibility that the student of history will miss the point or learn the wrong lessons. Mark Twain in his own fashion summed up the problems in using history and drawing the wrong conclusions from it. "We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again—and that is well; but she will never sit down on a cold one."[17]

The problem of American policy is much broader than Vietnam. We have miscalculated the nature of

"Friend" or "Foe"? Common sights on fields, roads, in hamlets, and cities. Every day their number is increasing.

the world today and its revolutionary spirit. We have become too much the Metternichs. Americans are children of revolution; we were the first new nation. We talk now like Metternich and the old order. The troubling force in the world today is not only communism. It is revolution itself. The French Revolution, and our own, set loose a spirit in the world that has never been tamed. Those events launched the age of revolution, which is still our world and age, demonstrating that a people could take destiny into its own hands, not enduring what had always been but creating a new future. "Happiness is a new idea in Europe," declared the French revolutionary, St. Just, to the Convention; and ever since the Revolution, people have expected to be happy and to live a tolerable life on earth.[18] To use Adlai Stevenson's phrase, we live amidst the revolution of "rising expectations." What in former ages would have been endured as inevitable—sickness, hunger, poverty—becomes now an occasion for revolution and change. Expectations are higher; revolution becomes the norm. Communism is a part of this larger revolutionary movement, but only a part. Remove communism from the universe by some wave of the wand, and revolution and social unrest would still be with us. "Happiness" is an idea not only for Europe, but for the world.

Zinn in his *Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal* makes the point.[19]

> We should keep in mind that, at this point in history, communism is only part of a much broader movement—the rising of hungry and harassed people in Asia, Africa, Latin America (and parts of the United States). Forgetting this, we try to crush insurrection in one place (Greece, Iran, Guatemala, the Philippines, etc.) and apparently succeed, only to find a revolution—whether communist or Socialist or nationalist or of indescribable character—springing up somewhere else. We surround the world with our navy, cover the sky with our planes, fling our money to the winds, and then a revolution takes place in Cuba, nearby. (If Harlem Negroes tried to take over Manhattan, would we blame that on Castro?) We see every rebellion as the result of some plot concocted in Moscow or Peking, when what is really happening is that people everywhere want to eat and to be free and will use desperate means, and any one of a number of social systems, to achieve their ends.

The problem is not so much any great ideology trying to engulf the world, "rather, that various peoples want to take over their parts of the world, and without the courtesies that attend normal business transactions." Vincent Harding's Amsterdam World Conference talk, "The Peace Witness and Revolutionary Movements," adds more light to the subject.[20]

Americans, their revolutionary ardor long cooled, have become the children of Thermidor. Prizing stability above all else, American policy resists change in every part of the world. How can one talk about meaningful world stability which does not take into account the most powerful force at work today—the revolutionary thrust of whatever ideology. Nationalism, the self-determination of Asia and Africa, race, the desire for a better way of life: in short we live in an age of rising expectations which can never be reconciled with the shape of the world today.

Vietnam is Metternich's war. Metternich and the old order of the nineteenth century stood firm against the unsettling changes provoked by the French Revolution. Like the fire brigade, the Metternichians rushed about stamping out the sparks of nationalism and liberalism everywhere. If we stand firm against the new forces, Metternich assured the old order, we "will overcome the storm itself." They stood firm, and they themselves were overcome. Are there any lessons here for us?

In the end, history does give us some answers if we know what kind of questions to ask. I am aware, however, that the decision makers are not much interested in getting the kind of answers which are set forth here. Why make the effort? What is the use of still another critique on Vietnam, another credo? Perhaps the voice of an anonymous seventeenth-century English nonconformist gives the response.[21] On being asked why he and his crowd continued to dissent against the all-powerful forces of state and church, he shot back, "And if we must needes be oppressed by them, is it not worth a litle inke and paper, to demonstrate, that it is in a good cause?" "By this meanes, our consciences are justified; our afflictions made more tolerable; our oppressours though more angered, yet must of necessitie be less insulting; . . . and Posteritie shall not say, that (for our owne ease) we betrayed the cause. . . ."

FOOTNOTES

1. Harold Macmillan, *Winds of Change, 1914-1939* (New York, 1966), p. 509.
2. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948), p. 321.
3. Howard Zinn, *Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal* (Boston, 1967), p. 85.
4. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Bitter Heritage* (Fawcett Crest Book, 1967), pp. 77-81.
5. "Conversation with Walter Lippmann," *The New Republic* (December 9, 1967), p. 19.
6. *Wichita Eagle*, (December 23, 1967), p. 6A.
7. Schlesinger, *Bitter Heritage*, p. 81.
8. *Wichita Eagle*, (December 25, 1967), p. 4B.
9. *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, (New York, 1963), p. 372.
10. For some new thinking on Korea and Vietnam, see C. T. McGuire and Charlton Ogburn, Jr., "Vietnam and Korea: An Exchange of Views," *The New Republic*, (December 2, 1967), pp. 15-18.
11. Schlesinger, *Bitter Heritage*, p. 82.
12. "Conversation with Walter Lippmann," p. 19.
13. *The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations*, (New York, 1962), p. 81.
14. *Vietnam*, p. 99.
15. Quoted in Harvey Goldberg, *The Life of Jean Jaures* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1962), p. 287.
16. *Bitter Heritage*, p. 87.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
18. Crane Brinton, *The Shaping of Modern Thought* (Spectrum Book, c. 1950), p. 109.
19. p. 103.
20. *Mennonite Life* (October, 1967), p. 161 ff.
21. *A Fresh Svit against Human Ceremonies in God's Worship* (n.p., 1633), "A Postscript."

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

Group Egoism

Dear Editor:

The article by Johannes Harder on "Group Egoism" (Jan., 1968), points out problems which need to be solved. Group egoism is our primary problem. The divisions in our brotherhood have had so many negative results that the future of our brotherhood is at stake. Only radical changes and utmost efforts to unite can prevent disaster.

The divisions started in the earliest days of Anabaptism in the Netherlands and were transplanted to Prussia and Russia, where some seven different Mennonite groups could be found. However, the number of divisions in Russia was small in comparison to what has happened among the Mennonites of North America.

We ask ourselves who caused and tolerated these divisions and what were the reasons? It seems that the leaders deserve most of the blame for the divisions. If anybody is inclined to assume that this trend will discontinue because we now have a theologically trained ministry, he may be mistaken. Theological training is no panacea for prevention of division. This is noticeable when trained ministers refute so-called "fundamentalism."

Some divisions resulted from the relationship of the Christian to the world around him. The way of life, dress, jewels, furniture, tobacco, alcohol, beard, theater, and other matters often caused divisions.

The results of the divisions have been manifold. Walls were erected between various groups. Lack of fellowship during communion and sharing of the pulpit between various groups are still strong. Each conference has its own schools, mission fields, etc.

Although there are always reasons for church renewal, the zealots who, as a result of such effort caused divisions, lacked insight and foresight. The parting groups used the body from which they seceded as a mission field. It should have been possible to prevent splits by applying brotherly love and tolerance within the group.

If there is still a way out of this unfortunate situation, we will need the courage to discuss the situation in the press and on the local and conference levels. We must become convinced that the divisions are against the will of God. We must be willing to reunite what has been torn asunder. If we ignore our responsibility as if there were no such problems, we will be blamed for the breakdown of the brotherhood into which God has placed us and in which we are to fulfill our life's task.

SASKATOON, SASK. *Walter Quiring*

The Poet Gerhard Wiens

Sirs:

In your January issue you published two Low German poems by Gerhard Wiens, also in English translation. In the poem *Sien Wiedeboom* Wiens has related touchingly our tragic and difficult experiences during the beginning of the century in the old country. I have read these poems to friends and they appreciate them greatly. Could Mr. Wiens write some short stories in the Low German in his typical seriousness spiced with humor? We have so little literature in Low German.

Mennonite Life is making a significant contribution in presenting information pertaining to the Mennonites not only of the past but also of the future. I am looking confidently into the future of the Mennonite Church even though it will be very different from what it was in Russia or what it now is. With the help of God, we will not only be able to preserve proven characteristics of our heritage but we will also be able to make a contribution in general and particularly in the realm of Christian aspirations in the world of tomorrow. I appreciate your work very much. May God help you.

With warm regards,

WINNIPEG, MANITOBA *J. H. Enns*

J. G. Ewert

Sirs:

I think the article by James Juhnke, featuring J. G. Ewert in the last issue of *Mennonite Life,* was very good. The picture was wonderful. My sister, Mrs. H. H. Gaede, and I are the only living relatives left.

Very Sincerely yours,
Dorothy Gaede

(We are inviting our readers to make use of this page by writing us).

RECENT PROTEST ART

By Robert W. Regier

"Think" by Cply (silkscreen).

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS, whether jubilant or tragic, or somewhere between, are inevitably mirrored in our expression. The mirrored expression may be "disengaged," matter-of-fact, reasonably bare of subjective, ideological overtones; or "engaged," loaded with subjectivity, and consciously designed to disturb. Collectively, all the art of our time or any other time mirrors the culture that produced it. But some art within this large collective mass will tend to mirror specific aspects of the human condition or specific events in time.

The Legacy of Realism

Realism, sometimes fused with romanticism and expressionism has traditionally been the most appropriate vehicle conveying more specific commentary on human, social, and political events. Realism defined here, is that which rejects the ideal and the imaginative in favor of becoming closely associated with a study of life as it is candidly found—unvarnished, all warts and blemishes exposed. Realism has a long tradition but has not always been received well. Caravaggio, a sixteenth century Italian painter who worked out of the tradition of idealized religious subject matter, offended his public by suggesting that, after all, saints —including Christ—might really be like every ordinary person. However, people resented meeting themselves in his paintings.

Beyond less-than-ideal human form is less-than-ideal personal and national behavior, particularly as it manifests itself in time of war. In the early nineteenth century, within the tradition of romantic realism, we have one of the great documents on human brutality. Fran-

"Guernica" by Pablo Picasso (1937). Museum of Modern Art, New York.

cisco d' Goya, a brilliant Spanish painter, executed a series of eighty-five etchings between 1810 and 1820 that eventually became known as the "Disasters of War."

Goya witnessed Napoleon's invasion of Spain first-hand and proceeded to formulate, through his etchings, a violent attack on the French and the cruelty with which he saw them prosecute the war (see back cover). Despair over wholesale killing and the callousness that it produces is expressed in many of his prints.

Realism feeding heavily on expressionism was the vehicle for another stinging commentary on war by Kaethe Kollwitz, a German artist who died in 1945. Her primary response was to World War I in which her son was killed, but she also lived long enough to see her grandson die in World War II. Her subject was suffering, particularly the suffering of women and children (see cover). Her world was a world of victims, particularly victims of war. Her persistent theme was death.

One more example will suffice to suggest a tradition behind the recent art on Vietnam. Often considered one of the great paintings of the twentieth century, Picasso's "Guernica" is a visual monument of man's inhumanity to man. Picasso himself has said only that it symbolizes "brutality and darkness." On April 28, 1937, the ancient Spanish town of Guernica was destroyed by German planes flying for General Franco. About a thousand people—one out of eight—were killed. It was the first example of modern saturation bombing. Two days later Picasso began to work on this twenty-six foot mural. By leaning heavily on cubist form mastered earlier, he composed this horror scene of shrieking, broken, and dead bodies. The American, Rice Lebrun, who has also given us a record of social commentary in his drawing, wrote that "Guernica is to be six at fifty. . . . All great drawing is made by the strategy of innocence, with the ammunition of adulthood."

The Artist and Vietnam

Today we have another war that moves people to the depths evidenced in Goya, Kollwitz, and Picasso. It should logically follow that this war too would spawn visual documents of protest. However, abstract expressionism, pop, op, electronic, kinetic, and minimal art, which are some of the movements of the present, tend to be less specific and more concerned with pure visual phenomena. To a large extent the new art is not a window, it is not about something beyond itself. Realism is not very much alive. Yet after mentioning all this, it is surprising to see the extent to which older and new forms have been shaped and modified into social weapons.

The most ambitious attempt to gain impact through protest art was a recent exhibit in New York called "Protest and Hope." Placed in the Art Center of the New York School for Social Research were forty-eight pieces by forty-three artists that collectively provide a commentary on civil rights and Vietnam. The names included are impressive: Baskin, Frasconi, Indiana, Levine, Rauschenberg, Rivers, Segal, Shahn, and Warhol. They are some of the names that are very well established in American art. The inclusion of some is no great surprise. Ben Shahn, for example, has always been involved in social commentary. His painting "Goyesca #2" was prepared especially for this exhibit. With the obvious reference to Goya's work Shahn depicts a multi-headed, multi-armed military dictator simultaneously manipulating strings and folding his hands in piety and innocence.

The forms of Shahn are rather traditional and do not create any real shock. The work of others in the exhibit, such as George Segal and Red Grooms are more radical departures from the past and are deeply indebted to the pop movement. The sculptor Segal, a Rutgers graduate, has become noted in recent years for his creations of figures in environments. These environments are hum-drum Americana—a corner hamburger stand or truck driver in his cab that contain life-sized plaster figures. Prepared especially for the "Protest and Hope Exhibit" was an environment titled "The Execution." To suddenly be hard-hitting and specific was not particularly difficult for Segal because of the suitability of his style.

An image even more specific was another created just for the show, "Patriot's Parade #2" by Red Grooms. His comic caricatures grow directly out of the pop movement. The central figure in his composition is an obvious caricature of President Johnson. The little girl on the right is designated as Miss Napalm.

The "Protest and Hope Exhibit" incorporated a wide range of approaches to the problem of social commentary. Paul Mocsanyi, organizer of the exhibit, expresses his personal bias for social commentary through art in the exhibition catalog. Referring to what he sees as a revival of human, social, and political commentary he writes:

> The first powerful impulse came the day of the great national tragedy. The echoes of the shots fired in Dallas on November 22, 1963, reverberated in the hearts and minds of many artists. It was a call for new involvement.
>
> But the prejudice about what art should and should not be still blocked the resurgence of social commentary. Should the artist's deepest concern be the arrangement of colors on a flat canvas or the investigation of relationships between geometrical shapes, even in a century of world wars, mass persecution, torture and gas chambers and a threatening third—atomic—world war?
>
> The emotional chain reaction triggered by the assassination needed another shock. It came with the growing civil rights crisis and with Vietnam.



"The Execution" by George Segal (plaster and other media).

"Killed Youth" by Leon Golub (lithograph).

"Kill for Peace" by Carol Summers (silkscreen).

"Patriots' Parade" by Red Grooms (painted construction).

"Goyesca -2" by Ben Shahn (oil painting).

Untitled by Seymour Rosofsky (silkscreen).

Prints by Cply, Golub and Summers are from the Artists and Writers Protest portfolio, published by Associated American Artists, New York.

Print by Rosofsky is from Protest Papers, published by Artists Collaborative, Chicago, Ill.

Works of art by Segal, Grooms, and Shahn are from Protest and Hope Exhibit, 1967, New School Art Center, New York.

Last spring while looking for material for this exhibition, I was amazed by the quality and quantity of protest work found in artist's studios. I have always hoped that the time would come again when the artist would not only be a specialist of colors, lines, and shapes, but also the living conscience of society.

The "Protest and Hope Exhibit" was significant enough to earn a full scale review by Hilton Kramer in the November 5, 1967, issue of the *New York Times*. It was by no means complimentary. Kramer wrote:

The fact remains that we value works of art, even works of art explicitly political in style or motif for their esthetic quality rather than their political content.

This is a fact that artists themselves are tempted—for the best of reasons—to ignore in moments of extreme political crisis. Clearly, the present is such a moment. Many artists, brooding on the war in Vietnam and the racial crisis at home, have experienced a profound sense of helplessness and despair.

It is an exhibition that leaves us with no doubts as to where the artists stand on the political questions of the day. They are against the war; they are against the unequal position of the Negro; and they abominate the government that has escalated the one while failing to correct the other. With all of these political sentiments I am in complete agreement. Yet this exhibition is one of the most depressing I have ever seen, . . . because it reveals the almost total esthetic bankruptcy of our artists when it comes to dealing with issues beyond their customary specialized concerns.

Some of these artists have simply abandoned their own standards entirely, and given themselves over to a kind of quick visual journalism.

Others resort to a kind of cartoon warfare. Red Grooms is an artist I admire, but his amusing painted constructions, with their comic-strip style and exuberant good cheer, prove to be helpless as a medium of political satire. Any day of the week, the latest Herblock cartoon is more incisive, more ruthless, more comprehensive in its grasp of realities.

Still others have simply submitted examples of their ordinary production and appended political titles or commentaries to them. This, at least, is an open admission that the artist has found it impossible to bring his art into a more direct relation to his political concerns. I find this admission far more affecting than all the raucous attempts to disguise it.

Kaethe Kollwitz shows us a world she has observed at firsthand while the artists at the New School show us a world they have only read about in the paper or watched on television. Kollwitz was not a great artist, but her vision was authentic and her own.

It is this sense of the artist at the center of his own vision that one misses at the New School.

Earlier in 1967, advertised under the banner of "Angry Arts—Artists and Writers Protest Against the War in Vietnam," sixteen New York artists and eighteen poets collaborated to produce a portfolio of poems and original prints. The problems Hilton Kramer found in the "Protest and Hope Exhibit" apply to this portfolio as well. The poems were printed separately. The sixteen prints were hand-signed by well-known and lesser known artists. The prints can be grouped in three loose categories. First, there are the artists whose customary visual style accommodates social commentary such as the print titled "Killed Youth" by Leon Golub, a well- known expressionist painter. Then there are those who, according to Kramer, abandon their own styles entirely in order to make a hard-hitting journalistic statement. The print by Carol Summers called "Kill for Peace"—probably named after a Bob Dylan song—illustrates Kramer's point well. Summer's print contains one of the more sensational devices in the portfolio; a series of machine gun-like holes penetrating the print horizontally.

The third category contains those whose sympathies lie within the intent of the portfolio but who find it impossible to adapt their ordinary production to a specific protest message. Thus the prints contributed are non-objective and cannot be read in any literary or symbolic sense.

One more collaboration will be noted. This is a more modest project by twenty Chicago artists. These artists collectively published a set of prints titled "Protest Papers." The title page simply states: "These twenty painters and sculptors in twenty serigraphs express their dissent, their revulsion, their protest of the Administration's inhuman, unjustifiable war in Vietnam. It is a hand printed edition of 130 copies. The prints are varied. Some are hard-hitting protest messages while others are non-objective. The untitled print by Seymour Rosafsky serves as an example of one of the more direct messages.

In addition to the examples discussed there are numerous other projects specifically related to the war in Vietnam. For example, from February 12 to March 31, 1967, a hundred painters, sculptors, printmakers, and photographers were represented in the Terrain Gallery in New York by an exhibition called "All Art Is for Life and Against the War in Vietnam." As suggested in this title, *all* art is against the war in Vietnam. Therefore, it was not necessary to create art specifically against the war. Thematically, then, this exhibit had the character of any exhibit. The statement accompanying the show reads, "We are ashamed of what our country is doing in Vietnam. Proceeds from the sales of work will go to the Committee of Responsibility which aids the Napalm burned and crippled children of Vietnam." Since this exhibit has ended, the Gallery has designated one wall as a premanent protest wall for any artist who wishes to use it.

Topping the Terrain Gallery exhibit in nmbers was another exhibit titled "Art for Peace" which was held in October. It was designed to coincide with the March

on Washington and included two hundred major New York artists. Sales from this exhibit amounted to twelve thousand dollars which was used for protest projects.

The Perils of Protest Art

Finally, do we simply conclude that the protest art of 1966 and 1967 has been eloquently done before via Goya, Kollwitz and others and now is being repeated? Or are there differences? It seems that because, for better or for worse, the art forms of the mid-twentieth century have been exploring paths vastly different from Goya's forms, the artist is less well equipped for a Goya-like task. Consequently, the art of protest often seems awkward. The political crisis of this moment has spawned a second crisis of aesthetics and personal integrity for the artist. Can he modify or abandon his existing personal vision in order to develop the idiom necessary to carry his burning message? Has he experienced the war personally and deeply enough to bring authority and authenticity to his work rather than easy rhetoric and superficiality? The vision of Goya and Kollwitz grew directly out of experiences they knew and felt intimately, but perhaps with the evolution of mass media we all are capable of feeling things intensely that we don't directly experience.

There is yet another *dilemma*, the problem of the specific and the general. When do we emphasize one or the other? Historically, we can see that art that functions as a generality has much more potential for outliving the event that inspired it. Art that is tied intimately to a specific event frequently dies with the event itself. By identifying no time, no place, no individual, art replaces "this was" with "this is." This is what caused John Canady, another *New York Times* critic to say that protest art "inevitably must fall victim to its own intensity. When Goya created his Horrors of War, he was first inspired by the Napoleonic invasions . . . But in the end he was not telling us of a single invasion, or even about war, but about man's capacity for beastliness." We can hope that some of the Vietnam art will possess this transcending quality. But perhaps we should not press the point. Some artists will dominate and transcend their own time. Others will be dominated by it. Maybe both serve legitimate functions.

I suspect that the artist who feels he has something to say does not lose sleep over questions concerning the ultimate value of his work. He will act with whatever energy and sensitivity he has and let others intellectualize the result. I will admit I am attracted to this attitude, at least if the alternative tends to be paralysis and inaction due to over-concern about possible judgments. Critics will continue to venture opinions on whether or not a given visual result is art; but somehow, under the shadow of an expanding war cloud, that question seems stripped of high priority.

Whether or not to react is no unique problem for the artist. Each of us has to agonize over appropriate and honest responses through logical mediums, somewhere between the polarities of a sterile reason and blind emotion.

TO SAVE THE WORLD

By John F. Kauffman

over there

pacified peasants
shrouded in a sheet of fire

an agony of atrocities
committed
in the name of
peace
freedom
justice

in my name stop
but
the phrase falls from the lips of
a crucified man

probing for
a wonder or a word
but
my vision is shrouded
with the threat of holocaust

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Order through *Mennonite Life*, North Newton, Kansas 67117.

PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM

By John M. Janzen

UNTIL EARLY IN 1967 it was common in government circles to speak of America's commitment to two wars in Vietnam: the one a shooting, bloody and ugly, but limited and temporary, war aimed at crippling the enemy; the "other war" a series of civilian programs aimed at turning the loyalties of the Vietnamese people to the Saigon government and the side of freedom. In the months following, the other war has increasingly been publicized by our government as the real war of nation building, yet simultaneously the shooting war has only continued to expand in scope. My purpose here is to examine the implications of this pursual of what appears to be two diverging, if not mutually contradictory, paths toward peace in Vietnam, in terms of what is happening to Vietnamese society in the process.

Through 1966 the other war was managed through six distinct operations with Washington and Saigon offices, financed largely by our government, and staffed by American and Vietnamese government personnel and other civilian agencies.[1] The Refugee Division was charged with caring for the more than 800,000 refugees remaining in camps of the 1,700,000 registered refugees in the two years since 1965. The Psychological Operations Division was designed as a psychological offensive to disrupt Vietcong morale, to turn the peasants against the VC, and to advertise the benefits of supporting the Saigon government (in 1966 "PsyOps" sprayed 2.8 billion leaflets over the countryside). The Chieu Hoi "Open Arms" Program rehabilitated surrendered Vietcong (20,000 in 1966).[2] The Public Safety Division was designed to reinforce the National Vietnam Police Force (72,000 men, three times more per capita than in the U. S.),[3] through the issuance of nine million new forgery-proof ID cards and the installation of a central fingerprint file in Saigon. The New Life Development Division sought to raise and improve peasant agriculture through credit arrangements and subsidized distribution of fertilizers and insecticides.

Finally, there was the much-heralded Revolutionary Development Division, launched jointly by the American Government through the CIA and the Vietnamese Government as Saigon's own counter-revolutionary program against the enemy. Using many of the Vietcong's own tactics, "RevDev," as it came to be known, embodied the guiding idea that finally now the allies could fight fire with fire, and win the control and support of the people in much the same way that the Vietcong had in past decades. Journalist John Mecklin wrote that the Revolutionary Development Program had received so much attention in Saigon in the last year that Mao Tse Tung's works on guerrilla warfare, one of its sources of inspiration, "are among the most dog-eared volumes in town."[4]

The origin of this interesting turn by the United States and Saigon to quasi-revolutionary methods to counter and affect Communist revolutionary insurgents can be traced in part to the growing realization in Saigon that "the Communists have let loose a revolutionary idea in Vietnam and it will not die by being ignored, bombed, or smothered . . . thus we must oppose the Communist idea with a better idea, [namely] to launch . . . our own program of revolutionary warfare that will include the spirit of the British Magna Carta, the French Liberty-Equality-Fraternity, and the U. S. Declaration of Independence."[5]

A second factor, considerably more distant from the problems of the Vietnamese peasant village, which has motivated our "revolutionary" turn, is the present administration's rising fear that the Congress and the American people will become disenchanted with the war and that it will be left in the lurch in 1968. The administration in Washington, by various estimates, has until early 1968 to prove to America and the Congress, not necessarily that it *has* won the war, but, that it is at least beginning to win the war.[6] Thus if there ever was a "revolution" under pressure, it is this one; a curious contrast to the enemy's resolute patience and endurance.

But the most compelling reason for this "revolutionary" turn in American operations is the gravely-real eventuality that despite our enormous military strength on the battlefield, it is only through pacification, village reconstruction, and as a consequence the miraculous return en masse of the peasant population to the Saigon government, that we can produce a visible way for the U. S. to escape from Vietnam, except in defeat in the "real war" for the loyalties of the Vietnamese through nation building.[7]

Pacification and development (the broad front of non-military operations financed by the U. S. government), take on capital importance if we realize that about four-fifths of the South Vietnamese population is rural, peasant, and normally out of contact directly with the American or the Saigon government personnel.

Forest Kimler remarks, correctly, I believe, that to win the allegiance of these millions "is what the fighting is all about."[8] Thus in 1966 the United States spent over twenty-million dollars for the Vietnamese-staffed Revolutionary Development program alone, only one of the numerous civilian programs, which sent graduates of the "RevDev" school near Saigon out to the hamlets at the rate of nearly 4000 every three months trained as teams to combine "armed defense and propaganda" with "rural reconstruction."

Yet in spite of the general importance given to civilian programs, there was considerable uncertainty among American administrative personnel as to how they were to be directed. Normally American governmental civilian programs such as AID are directed from Washington and a local branch office in the host country. While such a bureaucratic set-up may lead in a case like Vietnam to a considerable degree of department autonomy and overall lack of coordination, individual program autonomy, distinct from any military operations in the country, is seen by civilians in our government as necessary for effective response to local exigencies. But the Washington administration, sensing the significance of civilian programs, and wishing to eliminate the bureaucratic inefficiency of multiple chains of command from Washington, decided in late 1966 to create a unified civilian command network called the Office of Civilian Operations (OCO) which would centralize all civilian programs under one Saigon bureau.

There is a widespread opinion in the American press that this centralization of civilian program command was just the preparatory step for the late-May military take-over, the bending in purpose of the civilian programs to the military goal. Today the Civilian Operations in Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), as the OCO has been renamed, is directed through, if not by, the military high-command in Saigon where Westmoreland is ultimately in charge of all decisions.[9]

Thus, for better or for worse, it is the heavy-handed military path to pacification for which our government has opted in Vietnam. This means, in effect, that the government has not seriously believed the doctrine of effective and separate civilian work in the total task of nation-building. Predictably, government announcements of the "blended war" which merges the civilian and the military into one purpose have grown more common. Blended war, or "total war" tactics, as they are also sometimes called, has increasingly shown itself in the day-to-day operations of the war. First we must rout the main force of the enemy, then "mop up" the enemy sympathizers, and finally reconstruct what is left within the militarily-created pocket of "security."

The total war, from military assault to brotherly love, is described in a recent issue of *The Economist*. First a military headquarters base is secured close to the provincial population centers. "Once the enemy's main forces have been cleared from the immediate surroundings, 'search and destroy' operations are mounted at ever increasing distances from the area headquarters. This spreading-ripple technique is made possible by the ability to move and supply troops by helicopter and fast armoured transports. . . . By returning to their main base area after each operation, and at the same time maintaining close daily contact with the provincial chiefs (who also command the local South Vietnamese provincial and local forces) the allies are just beginning to establish a sense of security that has been lacking in the past."[10] It is this that Westmoreland speaks of as encouraging success in the military phase of the war. The technique has best succeeded for the allies in the II Corps area along the coast where the distinct geographical advantage has placed a large population concentration along the narrow coastal strip with the large Central Highlands relatively unpopulated. In this area the Saigon government's Revolutionary Development projects are beginning to show progress.

That it will be a long, hard, and uphill battle to first drive out the enemy troops, then pacify, and then develop, goes without saying. The trouble is that many of the Vietcong are more opaque than uniformed soldiers; they blend in too well with the village populations. Military advisers still in 1967 confess that "nobody really knows how many of South Vietnam's estimated 12,000 hamlets are under total Vietcong control. The number is at least 4,000."[11] Another source states that at least half of the hamlets of South Vietnam are under the control of the Vietcong.[12] In any case, it is conceded by almost everyone that thousands of the hamlets are contested, usually meaning that the South Vietnamese authorities may enter without difficulty in the daytime while the Vietcong rule at night. John Mecklin, already cited above, suggests that "no more than perhaps one out of five hamlets nationwide is secure enough for American or Saigon officials to enter safely by day or night without armed escort . . . (And) these 2,000 or so hamlets are the only ones that can be counted as 'pacified' and really under the control of the Saigon government . . . Even then, many of them are religious communities (mainly Roman Catholic and the anti-Communist Hoa Hao sect) that have kept out the Vietcong for their own special reasons and with their own resources. A measure of Vietcong strength (this written earlier this year) is the fact that in the entire country not much more than 100 miles of highway can be travelled at night without a (military) escort."[13]

Perhaps one of the best indications of the state of voluntary or involuntary village loyalties is the fact that in the recent elections only 984 of the 2,526 villages[14] were secure enough to permit setting up voting polls in them. The remainder were considered Vietcong villages, and ipso facto eliminated from the voter registration, still in need of "pacification" and "revolution-

A Vietnamese refugee family in newly established refugee village.

izing." But even then, the number of secure villages at election time was some 100 less than in mid-1966 when the elections were originally proposed.[15]

What is at issue here is not so much the authenticity or the inherent desirability of the Revolutionary Development program—if we discount the defections, the lethargy, and the overzealous tactics utilized in routing out Vietcong suspects— but the guiding assumptions, the philosophy if you please, of the American "total war" effort, spelled out by General Westmoreland as follows: "To defeat the Vietcong and build a nation, our entire effort—U. S. and Vietnamese, military and civilian—is built around a three-phase strategy: (1) a military offensive to defeat the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army main forces, (2) Revolutionary Development to continue the restoration of security and establish government control, (3) nation building, to develop a nation that can survive in the modern society of nations."[16]

This strategy carries with it one key assumption: that militarily-created security, whatever the cost in dollars or lives, is the most effective in creating the conditions of nation-building. In concrete terms this means that it is believed that if the allied forces can just push back and "hold at bay"—a phrase frequently used—the mainline enemy troops, then Saigon, with our money, will be able to create support for itself out of the remaining population and make of it a viable nation.

A corollary to this main assumption regarding the effectiveness of the "military solution" to our problem in Vietnam is the oft-expressed view that the Vietcong can be, as it were surgically sliced apart from the main body of Vietnamese peasants. In the words of one U. S. official, "the main long-range problem now is to stamp out—destroy—the Red *cadre* (the Vietcong local political workers) that is a cancerous growth, a malignancy, that has attached itself to the people."[17] Elsewhere among government voices the solution to this main "problem" is flippantly formulated in terms of destroying the Vietcong infrastructure at the village and hamlet level. A slightly more realistic, if unpleasant formulation of "our task" in Vietnam is that of both constructing and destructing.

The United States Government's prevailing military approach to peace in Vietnam and the belief that we need an imposed security before reconstruction can begin, is integrally related to our administration's

monolithic view of the enemy, a kind of "snap-off" or "slice-out" view of the Vietcong in Vietnamese society. This being the case, we may well have reason to fear, together with the Vietnamese villagers who are suspected of harboring the "enemy," what Eugene MacCarthy warned of, that "the administration has no limitations on itself in seeking a military victory."[18]

It is annoying and puzzling, to say the least, to hear administrative spokesmen contend that the Vietcong are an "extraneous parasitic appendage" of the society which we are hoping to preserve and reconstruct. Either our war's leaders have no one to tell them about the make-up of Vietnamese society, or they prefer to carry along an obviously erroneous view of Vietnamese society as a rationalization for our presence there. If this latter is the case, then it is clear why we have not pushed peace more ardently; a cease-fire now would probably amount to relinquishing control of a majority of the villages of the countryside to the Vietcong.[19]

One need go no farther than the Defense Department manual *Know Your Enemy: the Vietcong*[20] to find out that the enemy is not altogether a monolithic hoard of outlaws who have "invaded from the outside." True, by the end of 1966 the infiltrating North Vietnamese regulars had reached an estimated 45,000 in number and the elite Vietcong troops of the Liberation Army constituted some 70,000 men. But what of the 40,000 Communist *cadres*, political workers who ran schools, hospitals, and recruitment centers in their home areas, and who constituted the local Vietcong government in the villages? And the 130,000 or so Vietcong guerrillas from among the village population itself?[21]

The *cadre* and the local guerrillas are organized from the bottom up at the local level with considerable autonomy, according to the manual. "At the hamlet level the Guerrilla Popular Army, as these part-time forces are known, is either a cell, a half-squad, or a squad—three, six, or twelve men. At the village level the G.P.A. unit is the platoon, made of three or four squads, thirty-six to forty-eight men. These organizations at the local level constitute paramilitary forces and generally are local civilians who are only part-time soldiers or guerrillas, and whose military duties do not take them far from home."[22]

The U. S. administration obviously knows the nature of the local Vietcong's integration in the local population. Yet it seeks to explain away the obvious on the theory that the peasants are deluded, misguided, and deceived. A recent Revolutionary Development information brochure[23] for the U. S. military personnel suggests that "the Red propagandists had the protection of the Vietcong military arm and the support of the people and in this wise stayed in place [effectively]." How were they able to do this? The brochure suggests that they "were woven into the fabric of the people by marriage, family ties, or through long-formed friendships—to sow the seeds of dissension and rebellion." Now really, if marriage, family-ties, and friendship are vehicles of sinister subversion, then what is honorable?

If the military campaigns have succeeded in removing the National Liberation and North Vietnamese troops from certain areas, they have not succeeded in extricating part-time guerrillas or the *cadres* from among the people, those whom a recent *New York Times* report on a typical clash describes as "farmers by day and fighters by night."[24]

The top echelon of the American military are at times prone to self-criticism over the ineffectiveness of the "military approach" to pacification. Another counter-insurgency expert quoted by Kimler states lucidly the problem implicit in the combination of military pacification and militarily-protected village reconstruction. "Let us say," he begins, "that you are the commander or the commander's adviser, of a zone in which the communist insurgents are active. In your zone you have communities, hamlets, villages, towns. Now just because some of these communities support the communist insurgents—are these communities to be treated as part of the enemy or are they to be treated as part of the nation which the troops are sworn to defend? . . . If the troops start making war on the very communities which make up the nation they are defending, then to whom and to what are they (the troops) loyal?"[25] We may well pose the question from the point of view of the population: if the troops start making war on the community, how can these people be loyal to the government destroying them?

There is a long history of village autonomy, first of all, which has to be taken into account in understanding Vietnamese society.[26] It has been said of Vietnam's precolonial imperial days centuries ago that "the Emperor's law ended at the bamboo hedge around the village. Within that hedge the village was almost autonomous, a self-contained little state ruled by its village council of locally-named village notables."[27] Village autonomy extended into the religious beliefs of the people in that the ancestor cult, the collective dead of the community, provided an integrating symbol of sacredness; ritual observances toward the dead—and this includes the Buddhist and Catholic villages where the ancestors become local saints—constitute an important aspect of village or hamlet self-respect.[28]

Vietnamese village autonomy persisted to a degree through the colonial period, and provided the impetus for the anti-French Viet Minh movement. There is every reason to believe that in good part the local Vietcong continue in this tradition; not only of regarding colonial powers as intruders and oppressors, but of looking at any district, provincial, or national government such as Saigon as a threat.[29] The secret of Vietcong persistence through overwhelming odds has been their participation in a culture of suspicion toward

superior government and the memory that things have not been better in the past; anything they could do at the local level to improve the situation of the population would gain them support. It would be interesting to know if any landlords of large estates in rural Vietnam in the past became Vietcong. The chances are good that there were few. Wherever the Vietcong controlled a hamlet or village, wherever they ruled—as in much of the Mekong Delta where they have effectively constituted *the* local government for several decades now—they instituted land reforms by seizing the plots of the larger landholders and reapportioning them among the landless, of which they, no doubt, were a part. This alienated a wealthy minority but also created for them the legitimacy granted by the faceless numbers which the succession of Saigon governments has not begun to enjoy.

It is undoubtedly true that these village-originating Vietcong and their more elite, sophisticated front soldier colleagues have increasingly of late come under a measure of control from Hanoi; but even so, local support, or at least lack of opposition, is the only way one can explain the persistence of Vietcong presence. In a recent *Foreign Affairs* article Robert Shaplen argues that all this is not only a product of the autonomous village tradition, but of a South Vietnamese national identity distinct from association with the north. "There seems little doubt," he writes, "that the southern *cadres* (the Vietcong village government), no matter how thoroughly indoctrinated with communism they have been, and how well disciplined, still resent being ordered about in the execution of their revolutionary duties by northern political and military officers."[30]

What is ultimately at stake in our presence in Vietnam, I think, is whether or not we are, or will ever be, able to assist a Saigon government gain the legitimate support of a majority of the South Vietnamese people, and by this I do not mean militarily-imposed, lethargic consent. The path we are taking now, if pursued to its logical extreme, would, according to various estimates involve from a million and a half to three million troops—this to control fifteen million people! We are now imposing what we call "revolution" from the top, and while the theories and the projections of non-military goals look good, somehow we fail to be getting anywhere in the crucial areas of (1) creating a solid South Vietnamese army, (2) protecting the rural Revolutionary Development workers, and (3) implanting legitimate representative government. It is a peculiarity of the intangible quality known as nationalism that it cannot be exported, but must be generated out of the unique conditions of a specific human community.

Not all is lost in Vietnam, however much the war is a war of attrition in which everyone seems to be losing. There are encouraging signs that in spite of what Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington are up to, the South Vietnamese people are finding they must live with one another. Little is known here in America about local political settlements of hostilities, but in the tradition of local autonomy of problem-resolution methods quite apart from the concerns of national governments, "there are numbers of areas in Vietnam today where tacit cease-fires already exist between communist and government forces, each agreeing to leave the other alone."[31] If it is political unity that we desire for South Vietnam and the Vietnamese people, then we must encourage such political agreements wherever a glimmer of hope for local, if fragmentary, settlement appears, not divide against itself and thereby destroy each and every community to fit our preconceptions and designs. It is very difficult if not impossible to impose a true social revolution from the top by military force.

FOOTNOTES

1. Walter Guzzardi, Jr., "Management of the War: A Tale of Two Cities" (n.d., according to the content of the article, probably late 1966 or early 1967).

2. John Mecklin, "The Struggle to Rescue the People" (n.d., late 1966 or early 1967), p. 5.

3. David Welsh, "Pacification in Vietnam," *Ramparts*, October, 1967, p. 39.

4. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 1, considered sufficiently sympathetic to its position by U.S. AID to quote.

5. An unidentified counter-insurgency expert quoted by Forest L. Kimler, *Revolutionary Development: Plan for a New Vietnam* (MACV Office of Information: Command Information Pamphlet 4-67, February, 1967), p. 4.

6. Welsh, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

7. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

8. Kimler, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

9. *Organizations and Functions for Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support*, Directive 10-12, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), May 28, 1967.

10. "Vietnam: The State of the Battle," *The Economist*, November 18, 1967, p. 724.

11. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

12. Kimler, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

13. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

14. John Osborne, "Fantasy in Vietnam," *The New Republic*, May 27, 1967, p. 15.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Kimler, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

18. CBS Television News, November 30, 1967.

19. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

20. *Know Your Enemy: The VietCong*, (Armed Forces Information and Education: Department of Defense; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

21. Mecklin, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

22. *Know Your Enemy*, p. 4.

23. Kimler, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

24. Tom Buckley, "The Men of Third Squad, Second Platoon, C Company, Third Battalion," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 5, 1967.

25. Kimler, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

26. *The Vietnamese Peasant: His Value System*, U.S. Information Agency Research and Reference Service, R-138-35, October, 1965.

27. *The Vietnamese Peasant*, p. 1.

28. *Know Your Enemy*, p. 19.

29. *The Vietnamese Peasant*, p. 1.

30. Robert Shaplen, "Vietnam: Crisis of Indecision," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 1, October, 1967, p. 97.

31. Shaplen, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

CRUSHING THE ONES WE HELP

By Gene Stoltzfus

VIETNAM IS A tropical country. It has a great variety of animals. One of the animals in Vietnam is an elephant. There is a story told about one who was traveling in the hills one day through the narrow jungle paths. It was following a chicken with five or six little chicks and gently pushing the chicken along. All of a sudden an accident happened. It stepped right on the chicken and killed it. The elephant was very hurt by this development and decided to take care of the chicks. So it sat on them.

The story of what is currently happening to the Vietnamese people can perhaps be brought together quickly by referring to the levels of Vietnamese society as they are traditionally viewed by the Vietnamese. There is a tradition in Vietnam which implies that those who have studied. the monks, the academic people, the government people and the priests are the first class. The second class are the farmers. The third class are the laborers; fourth class are the businessmen and the fifth class are the military or the soldiers.

The Dilemma of the Intellectuals

We will keep these five classes in mind, beginning with the priest, the monk, and other educated people. As a rule the Vietnamese people respect their fellow Vietnamese in terms of these categories. In the last few years the educated people have made a variety of attempts to repair their society and to make some kind of creative contributions.

A teacher friend of mine in Nha Trang was asked to head up a summer youth program in the city of Nha Trang. This was a program in which the students would go out into the village and engage in various kinds of work projects and get experience in the countryside. My friend was an idealistic young man much like many of his compatriots who were also teachers at that school. After he had organized the program he was told that he should not carry on the program or he would be removed from his job. In the same year, 1964, and in 1965 this same thing happened throughout Vietnam in many of the high schools.

Recently twelve professors in Saigon, Da Lat and Hue banded together and published a statement anonymously simply because it was not safe for them to publish their names with it. I have a good guess as to who some of them were. They said that negotiations should come now between the government of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. They felt that negotiations between the government in South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese should proceed immediately and that following that negotiations should proceed between the bigger powers over the Vietnam question.

When I think of this upper class group of people, students and intellectuals, I think of a student I knew in Saigon. He usually appeared very well dressed and had two motorcycles. I asked what he was hoping to do when he finished his training in architecture. He said he hoped to go either to France or to the United States because he did not see any hope in Vietnam at the present time. This points up another major problem in Vietnam among this social higher class of people. They are going overseas because they do not see hope on the horizon. There are thousands and thousands of Vietnamese in Paris and there are many in this country as well.

Farming Depression

The second group of people includes the farmer. Outside of Nha Trang there is a little village called Cuu Loi. I went there in 1964 when I was associated with the government program which was called the Hamlet Education Program. This hamlet had had a little schoolhouse for a number of years and somehow it was destroyed or the teacher had not been available to teach. The government came in to build a school. The government selected a site against the advice of villagers and began to build the school with the help of a contractor. After they had proceeded for a time they stopped a while and the bricks which were made locally began to crumble.

Eventually the school was finished and when I went there one day the villagers took me in the school. When they touched the walls fairly gently parts of the wall gave way. Essentially what was happening was that the contractor had to make enough money so that he could pay the government official so the governmental official could pay the next government official and on up. The villagers saw this as a representation of their government and also the representation of America in Vietnam because somehow they knew that we were paying for it.

Montagnard men making a coffin from a log. Graves in background.

Later a pacification team came to this hamlet. It came and went. Their fishing grounds became smaller and smaller because the bombers coming back to Nha Trang were dropping the leftover bombs in the fishing areas of this vicinity. The area where they collected wood for charcoal was becoming narrower and narrower because of the presence of Korean troops and artillery.

For the farmer herbicide has also been quite a problem. I recall in 1965 in the area of Buon Drang between Pleiku and Qui Nhon we had a farm specialist from Illinois working. He discovered one day that the project in which he had worked for a long time was somehow withering up and dying. He knew quite a bit about herbicides. He made a study of his plants and then went to the attache' in charge who informed him that the Viet Cong had stolen some herbicides and shot them out over the hill.

This story was passed on upstairs as was another story which was given to him by the farmer (that American planes had sprayed the herbicides) and eventually I got caught in the middle out there somewhere trying to resolve both sides. This happened again and again throughout Vietnam particularly around military bases.

There is a lot of instability in the rural areas of Vietnam. Instability that is caused by the arrival of leaflets like the following: "The wicked Viet Cong have spread weapons and supplies in your village. Soon naval gunfire is going to be conducted on your village to destroy these Viet Cong supplies. We ask that you take cover as we do not wish to kill innocent people. When you return to the village repel the Viet Cong so that the government will not have to fire on your village again."

When people receive a notification like this, usually dropped out of a helicopter or other plane, they will react in a variety of ways. Probably they will not do anything at all. This means that at least some of the time a lot of people suffer simply because they have a great deal of attachment to the land and do not want to leave.

The farmer's life is interrupted in another way. In the Phan Rang area the French built an irrigation canal about thirty years ago that went down through the Trang Valley from the end of the valley towards the sea. In the spring it had become custom for the farmers to join together and clean up this canal so that rice production can continue throughout the year. It is necessary to keep the canal clean. When the mili-

tary base was built nearby, the American commander decided that the canal was a good place to get water. He also decided that when the time came to clean the canal the canal could not be cleaned this year because this was a source of the water for the base. So this means that twelve or fifteen thousand acres of rice land will probably suffer significantly because the water level in the canal may go down.

Some of the farmers have become refugees and have moved to another area where they have become farmers again. Strangely enough, we believe that this will change the minds of people. This does not always happen as was demonstrated in the Binh Dinh area which is in Central Vietnam, one of the areas that has been controlled by the Viet Cong for up to twenty years.

The several hundred village families were removed from an area that has been a battleground for quite a while and were taken near the base of the First Cavalry Division and resettled. After they resettled with the assistance of some other people they began to form gardens and take up something like a normal life. In a short time Viet Cong activities started in the new area again. The marketing system was disrupted as security became fairly bad for a while. The people who move from one area to another do not necessarily change their minds. In summary one of the big effects of the war on the farmers is that their numbers have been drastically reduced.

Effect of War on Labor

The third group is the laborer. One of the larger groups that has now become new laborers or a new kind of class in Vietnamese society is a war product: other refugees. An example are the refugees from Ben Sue which is near Saigon in the iron triangle area of the Cedar Falls operation. These people were removed under the glare of extensive publicity. We were told of the operations three days before it took place in the same meeting that the Vietnam Christian Service people and the Vietnamese government were told. They wanted us to give assistance in resettling these people. Members of the press were there and there was an enormous stage show for everyone to observe. Unfortunately it backfired. Mary McCarthy and a few other people were there and wrote about the whole thing and were fairly critical. But as a matter of fact the Ben Sue operation was probably the most successful, and of all such operations, carried out within the most humanitarian procedures. The people did have a place to go. They had water to drink and they had food to eat when they got out. This is much better than it is in many parts of Central Vietnam.

Many problems develop in refugee work. Refugees become apathetic because they are cut off from their homes; women are without men; their men are off fighting some place with someone's army; people become disoriented. They engage in passive resistance simply because they cannot resist in any other way.

This means that community organization breaks down within the refugee camp. When one tries to organize certain kinds of constructive activities such as crafts or agriculture, one often finds very little response. Sometimes this passive resistance is probably organized by someone in another part of the country. Sometimes it is simply because the people are so discouraged and so depressed that they do not want to engage in any sort of activities.

Poor camp sites are often chosen for these people. In Tuy Hoa hundreds and thousands of refugees have been settled along the coast on sandy beach areas where it is literally impossible to raise any crops. The people are often resettled on land that has been rejected for agricultural purposes.

Another problem the refugees face is that other Vietnamese in the area simply look down upon them because they are refugees and they come in from the outside. For these new laborers other kinds of activities have developed: a few of them who were resettled early have gone into the bar business for the American military men. Some of them have engaged in various kinds of work with the American bases.

Tradesmen

The fourth group in Vietnamese society is the business class. When the Cam Ranh Bay was being developed the province chief knew about it quicker than anyone else and so he bought a lot of the land so he could turn around and sell it back to the Americans. Later he lost his job but he is in a pretty good position now. I remember also the regular merchant in town who now has adjusted his price system to the American level which of course outprices the Vietnamese so that they very often find it difficult to buy necessary items. The merchants also have engaged in some very poor investments in terms of long-range value to Vietnam. An enormous number of hotels and living quarters for the foreigners have been built.

Finally, we have the Vietnamese soldier who has often been accused of not being a very good fighter. I will only say that as far as fighters are concerned I suspect that in all of Vietnam you find the best guerrilla fighters in the world. Recently in a very conservative Saigon paper, the following note appeared with regard to the military adviser-advisory relationship in Vietnam. "The Americans may be able to teach us how to drive a tank or fly a jet but how could they pretend to teach us guerrilla warfare?"

You now see that the Vietnamese society is flipped upside down. The fifth group is on top and the fourth group comes second. The priests, ministers, and the educated people are at the bottom salary-wise. Everything is turned around. This sums up what is happening to Vietnam and what the effects of the war on the Vietnamese people are.

THE SCIENTIST AND WAR

By Orville L. Voth

In view of the general increasing public dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war it will hardly be exciting news to say that among scientists there is also dissatisfaction, although their disenchantment with war in general is of somewhat longer standing, and that whatever scientists say today about Vietnam has its roots in a movement begun about twenty years ago in an agonizing reaction to nuclear weaponry. Although it is possible to find statements by individual scientists or by groups of scientists about the Vietnam war per se, these almost invariably reflect a deeper concern with nuclear war. One interesting group that reflects a direct reaction to the Vietnam policies of our President is the Scientists and Engineers for Johnson, founded in 1964.[1] Elinor Langer analyzes the change in attitude of this group toward Johnson since 1964 and then makes the following observations: ". . . to a surprising extent the war is getting to these leaders of the scientific establishment as individuals answerable to their own consciences.

"This growth of internal anguish among some of the most influential and productive leaders of the scientific community is significant in itself. 'The social compact is being broken,' one researcher observed. 'You have to obey society but you don't expect it to make you behave immorally. Now people are making private judgments.'

"What this means for politics is another question. These are not men and women who will join the hippies; they are not of the new or old left or right; they are in the mainstream of American politics where power is great but the range of action is defined more narrowly. At this writing it seems that the differences are too great to produce a unified Scientists and Engineers for anything in 1968"[2]

To be sure, there are men like Linus Pauling who invoke consideration of human suffering, immorality, and murder in specific connection with Vietnam. And for that matter, nuclear weapons are not the only threat to the human race that are of concern to scientists. Another which may be even more fearful is that of chemical and biological warfare. According to Linus Pauling, ". . . the great powers of the world are now spending about $500,000,000 per year in a feverish effort to develop a cheap (biological) way of killing hundreds of millions of people. . . ."[3] Since we have no really effective defense against either the effects or methods of delivery of many chemical and biological weapons, the question of nuclear strength is, in effect, academic.

My thesis is then that the scientist's opposition to Vietnam is rather one of opposition to war. Although this may not be nobler than some other reasons for opposing Vietnam, it *is* a realization that a small war may become a nuclear war which could well destroy civilization. In a broad sense then, it is a humanitarian-moral concern for mankind that prompts the scientist's opposition.

I mentioned that it was a little over twenty years ago that scientists of this country started on a campaign of study, public education, and politics that was without precedent. It may be interesting to briefly review this development since it is of fairly recent origin, and because this is a radical departure from pre-World War II attitudes. In those pre-war days, scientists were a small dedicated group, keeping aloof from the rest of the public. They lived in intense communication with their colleagues all over the world—an international fraternity which even wars and revolution could not altogether disrupt. They did not doubt the fundamental worth and virtue of their avocation. Science at its purest was a disinterested search for the truth and had no relation to daily human affairs. Whatever practical results that might come from it was bound to make man wiser and better and would improve his fate.

The short path from the discovery of nuclear fission to the atomic explosion over Hiroshima shattered this feeling of the remoteness of science from man's pursuit for power. Perhaps the promise of atomic energy had as much to do with this as did terror of atomic weapons but the age of innocence passed quickly, and since then, increasing numbers of people, including both scientists and non-scientists feel that scientists have a special and continuing role to play in the preservation of a democratic society, and that they have a special responsibility for the impact of science on such matters as foreign policy, military affairs, and economics.

If one were now to examine more closely the reasons for this sweeping change in the scientists' view of their own responsibility to society one would find a variety of reasons. Someone has suggested that the reason was

not an uneasy conscience because they had developed the bomb or prepared for bacteriological warfare—although a few may have had such a sense of guilt.[4] The majority, however, apparently felt they had no other choice—like a soldier in battle. In fairness to scientists who took the latter stance, one should recognize that at least some of them, like Robert Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr, and Hans Bethe, regretted that a brilliant discovery of science had to be perverted to an appalling weapon. Bohr and Oppenheimer, particularly, were active as early as 1946 in trying to persuade statesmen that international control of atomic energy was the only way to avoid a pernicious arms race or, worse, atomic war. Glenn T Seaborg has stated that there is hardly one of the major contributors to the Manhattan Project who has not felt the need to participate in developing public policy with regard to the control of nuclear energy.[5]

A second reason for scientists' uneasiness in the new age was born out of a loss of belief in the unquestioned goodness of their pursuit. Since the A-bomb science is no longer purely intellectual enjoyment—it may have some very serious moral implications—and this tends to take the fun out of it.

Whether there is any clearly discernible reason for the change in the attitude of scientists toward their social repsonsibility, the fact remains that the development of atomic energy marks the beginning of such changes and there is little doubt that the terrifying picture of an impending scientific war was a fundamental reason for the original change. Since the awakening in 1946, however, there have developed other reasons for believing that scientists have a special obligation in influencing the consequences of their developments. For example, F. A. Long, professor of Chemistry at Cornell University and a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee gives the following: (1) Scientists have "grown up" with the development of science and many have been involved in its applications to an increasingly technological civilization. (2) Their training and natural inclination are toward a quantitative analysis of problems which may add objectivity as well as a new dimension to an otherwise subjective argument. (3) More and more scientists have become "deeply informed on military-technical matters." This he identifies, however, with the original sense of special knowledge and obligation which grew out of scientists' wartime work on atomic energy. (4) Scientists feel that their language is an international one, as is their professional trust of scientists East and West, black and white—which makes possible consideration of more controversial matters.[6]

Whatever the reasons, many scientists have been interested and they have made some significant contributions. One should take note that there have been three specific reactions to the social problem raised in the mid-1940's: (1) Many scientists have tried to keep

Roof construction by a Montagnard refugee.

the tormenting picture of a future nuclear war out of their conscience. They believe there is nothing they can do about it. The inducement of high salaries, opportunities for research with sufficient support have helped them concentrate on professional achievement and discovery. (2) A minority have refused to take part in any research having military implications. (3) A larger group which may include some in the second category is trying to influence government policies. These last two groups then would make the world understand that the acceptance of new scientific gadgetry for war or peace without the acceptance of a new rational code of political behavior is the path to disaster. The latter group particularly has been active in a number of ways:

To study and report broadly on the complicated military-technical problems. This means, for example, that the atomic revolution which produced the megaton thermal fusion bomb presented some new problems in military systems as did the revolution in weapons delivery systems which can send one of these destructive bombs across an ocean in minutes. Although to a pacifist this hardly seems like a contribution to peace, concern about these military systems has led directly to serious anayltical study of arms control and the technical problem of disarmament, i.e., inspection, treaty monitoring, and arms destruction are highly technical.

Related to this, although concerned with a more general social repsonsibility of scientists, is the attempt to help the public understand recent scientific developments. The American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1960 stated, for example, that since many of the key public issues of the current era are concerned with scientific matters, scientists have specific responsibilities to interpret science and to act themselves as responsible and mature citizens. Although not specifically concerned with war, foreign policy, and the like, this AAAS report is interesting because of the reaction it engendered in some quarters. Herbert Stroup, writing in *Faculty Forum*, May, 1961,[7] takes issue with both of these suggestions on the following grounds:

There is probably an overestimation of the amount of interest which the public possesses in scientific matters. Stroup relates this to the complexity of scientific knowledge which makes communication an "authentic problem." C. P. Snow's "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution" testifies to this.

To act responsibly is no special task of scientists simply because of their science. That is to say there is nothing in the makeup of the scientist which provides him with a special clue to the human dilemma nor which gives him a necessarily persuasive influence upon non-scientists. In fact, says Stroup, scientists should have less influence since their message is complex and there is, indeed, nothing within science itself whereby trans-scientific matters can be decided—not even within the scientific fraternity itself (since there is disagreement, vis-a-vis, H. A. Bethe and Edward Teller) and finally, scientists have just now reached a point where they face in comparative innocence the major problems that philosophers and theologians have faced for centuries. In other words, they've got a lot to learn.

My brief rebuttal to Stroup might include the simple observation that it isn't arrogance that motivates scientists but rather a belief that the way they think and feel about scientific matters has a real bearing on the problems of mankind; that in science they are dealing with what may be a decisive civilizing force; that the principle of change must be applied to human institution and outlook if civilization is to flourish—indeed if it is to survive. That is to say that although science and technology have no direct solution to the basic human problems of freedom, dignity, a sense of purpose, and a hope of fulfillment of divine intimations—yet this does not mean that science has an impact only upon the physical things. David E. Lilienthal has written at length on the idea that science and scientists will have profound influences on the shape of the mind of man, his outlook on life, his attitudes toward others and toward himself. Lilienthal cites two ways in which this influence will make itself felt: (1) By changing the physical and material conditions of men's lives. (2) Many characteristic habits of mind and ways of thinking of scientists should and can become part of the way of thinking of non-scientists. While it would be most interesting and instructive to pursue these matters further, I refer you to Lilienthal's article on "Science and Man."[8]

Another area in which scientists have contributed to the cause of peace is in analysis of the role of science and technology in the economy. This is an exceedingly complex problem and the role of science and technology in building an affluent society may actually be secondary to political considerations. Nevertheless, scientists have contributed their share to this analysis.[9]

The discussion of technological problems which relate to political affairs is a fourth area of scientists' activities. These discussions have been primarily in the area of international affairs, the most famous of these being the Pugwash Conferences which began some ten years ago.[10]

In the domestic political arena the scientific community has enjoyed a less than satisfactory record. The *Washington Post*, in 1962 during the fall-out hysteria, said, ". . . the contributions of the 'science of human survival' are needed, but they may not be enough. . . . Governments, East and West, generally have found science sufficiently pliable, adaptive, flexible, and accommodating to produce scientific judgments in conformity with political necessities, as occasion arises." When one reviews the writings of Libby during this period and others later, this charge seems appro-

priate since it is hardly credible that they could themselves believe their own words about the chances of survival in a nuclear holocaust.[11]

Perhaps the naivety of the scientist in American politics forebodes his failure in world affairs—and he has certainly demonstrated little political sophistication. Like the earlier awakening to moral and ethical questions, the scientist is in these latter days coming to realize some political realities, too. He can hardly be blamed for his lack of knowledge of politics because the political atmosphere in which science existed until recently was provided by the heady goodwill of the Federal government. The war had demonstrated the value of science and technology and congress felt that it was in the national best interest for them to thrive. Politicians had no real notion of the peculiar nature of research—there was merely a faith that research should be generously supported. The result was that no political muscle was developed by the scientific community—money came too easily. Recently, the tide has changed, the flood of easy appropriations to science is receding and the scientist is obliged to "educate itself to the realities of how things get done in government."[12]

So, it is evident that scientists as individuals or as identifiable groups, warn against war as a means of settling disputes, for example, as participants in *Pacem in Terris* II Convocation, May 1967; or as signers of the Russell-Einstein manifesto, 1955. Perhaps the first large general organization of American scientists that displayed both an aroused conscience and aroused determination to move past war as a social tool was the AAAS. Its committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare issued an arresting statement of conscience in December of 1962.[13]

In conclusion, it would be instructive to consider whether scientists have any suggestion for their future role in human affairs—i.e., whether there is a further and continuing need for a sense of special obligation on the part of scientists, engineers, and technologists. It seems obvious that the broad category of problems facing society will require cooperative work with professionals of other disciplines too for the only effective solution to problems of food supply, population control, environmental control, and leisure time (which increases along with our material affluence), is a combination of scientific, sociological, and political efforts. The scientist can contribute to this team effort through technical aspects of economic development, foreign policy, arms control, and disarmament. It is not clear, however, that the methods scientists have been using will remain the preferred procedures for the next twenty years. For example, systems analysis may be a new method of treating complex problems. An illustration of this is given in an address by Charles R. Bowen, Manager Program Development IBM Corporation, in which he points to several examples of problems which can only be solved effectively on a long-range systems basis: transportation—supersonic transport and high-speed rail transport; or in construction—home fabrication techniques are decades behind those of automobile fabrications which is an example of systems approach to a specific problem we can all understand.[14]

At any rate, there is no lack of interest on the part of scientists, in participation, if not leadership, in helping solve the problems of materialism (society) which his scientific work has brought about. Scientists would certainly insist that they are scientists second, citizens and human beings first; that science is not for science. Science is for man. Although we may find a reason to be critical of scientists since only a minority refuse to take part in scientific work connected with military uses, and that the majority, even if opposed, are not very effective, I believe that there is a closer and more direct involvement of science in war and therefore, what opposition and question there is is genuine. In contrast to the vicarious experience of artists that Robert Regier refers to which gives rise to certain emotional reactions in them or others who view this art, reactions of scientists arise more directly from experience and knowledge of potential of their discoveries in war (or of their effects upon society), quite apart from war. They feel, it seems to me, that to halt scientific discovery and development is not the answer to the human dilemma. Hopefully, they see a potential answer at least in the developing—or catching up, as it were—of the humanities, social sciences, and religion. And in this they stand ready to help.

FOOTNOTES

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11. *You Can Survive Atomic Attack*. Booklet (1961); Salina *Journal*, No. 326 (1961).
12. Talk by Daniel S. Greenberg to American Association for the Advancement of Science, December, 1966.
13. Albert Schweitzer, "A Declaration of Conscience," *The Saturday Review*, Vol. 40, (May 18, 1957), pp. 13-20.
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HAS THE PRESS FAILED US?

By Maynard Shelly

Arthur Sylvester resigned as assistant secretary of defense for public affairs on January 5, 1967. Having served as the Pentagon's chief press officer during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, he cut a colorful swath through government bureaucracy.

"But whether he is arguing with a newspaperman or a general, Mr. Sylvester seems to be compelled to have the last word—even if it hurts him," said the New York *Times* once in a biographical sketch.[1]

The word that must have hurt most came in a conversation with American newsmen in Saigon in 1965.

"I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out here," he told them.

Morley Safer, the CBS correspondent who shook American audiences and the military establishment with his film of marines burning the village of Cam Ne, was one of the newsmen that Sylvester was berating.

Safer reported: "Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good.

"A network television correspondent said, 'Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaidens of government.'

" 'That's exactly what I expect,' came the reply."[2]

Sylvester had earlier been the center of controversy as the result of a statement made in New York to the Deadline Club of the Sigma Delta Chi on December 6, 1962, not long after the Cuban missile crisis. He said that when a nation was faced with nuclear disaster, the government had a "right to lie."[3]

Asked in Saigon about the credibility of American officials in giving information to the press, Sylvester said, "Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that?—*stupid*."

Sylvester's candor in this conversation was matched only by the contempt he showed to the newspapermen present. At one point, according to Safer, "the Honorable Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers."

In a later letter to the *Bulletin,* a publication of the Overseas Press Club, Sylvester wrote that it was "utterly untrue" that he had said he expected reporters to be "handmaidens of government."[4]

In testimony before the Senate's foreign relations committee, Sylvester was asked on Aug. 31, 1966, about the handmaiden statement.

"Did you say that?" Senator Fulbright asked.

"Categorically, no," Sylvester answered.[5]

But Malcolm W. Browne, a former Associated Press correspondent in Saigon, wrote the *Bulletin* quoting a memo from his colleague, Ed White, which said in part:

"Sylvester engaged specific correspondents in near name-calling, twice telling Jack Langguth [of the New York *Times*] he was stupid. At one point, Sylvester actually made the statement he thought the press should be 'handmaiden' of government."[6]

Will the real Arthur Sylvester stand up? What is the truth of the matter? Did he say "handmaiden" or did he not? I suppose it would not be unkind to say that a man's public and private statements as well as his public and private attitudes may sometimes be contradictory. And Arthur Sylvester may well be a living parable of the credibility gap.

When speaking to the Senate foreign relations committee, Sylvester said, "No government information program can be based on lies."

But the problem is, that all during the Vietnam conflict, more and more people in America have been finding less and less credibility in the things which their government has said about Vietnam.

John A. Lapp, a historian at Eastern Mennonite College, Harrisonburg, Va., says, "Samuel Johnson once noted that the first casualty of war is truth; the Vietnamese war has not missed this victim. Patriotic journalists have labeled the issue *credibility* which an earlier, more frank generation would have labeled *distortion, fakery,* or *lying*."[7]

Blame for the lack of credibility must be placed on the government, but the blot on the government has tainted also the press, as we will attempt to show later. If the government fails to tell the truth, we would hope that the press might still be able to salvage some of the truth. But the press has also failed.

But first let us examine the credibility of the government.

The first large commitment of troops in 1962 began under the cover of secrecy and with an effort to keep the nature of the movement away from public attention. Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's press secretary, says that the Administration "was not anxious to admit the

existence of a real war in Southeast Asia." Efforts were made to prevent reporters from observing what was going on and "the President pushed hard for us to tighten the rules under which correspondents could observe field operations in person."[8]

Reporters in Vietnam now have almost maximum freedom of movement and are not subject to censorship. Yet they have difficulty in getting information from government and military officials. Said Jack Foisie, a veteran war reporter for the Los Angeles *Times*, "However well the war is going at the moment, the American high command seems unable to speak with candor on battle activity, even after the battle is over."[9]

The suspicion of officials and their trustworthiness goes to the very top of government. Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York *Times*, says that correspondents "have a built-in skepticism and mistrust of government announcements and government figures that dates back to the days when Secretary McNamara was claiming that we were winning the war at the same time the correspondents were reporting—with far greater accuracy—that we were in deep trouble."[10]

Baldwin attributes part of the reason for this to the realities of power politics but also to the personality of our leaders. "The credibility gap has not developed overnight, nor is it the fault of any one man or any one department of the government. The atomic age, with its emphasis on secrecy and its encouragement of evasion, has tarnished the government's reputation for truthfulness. News management and news suppression—particularly in the Pentagon under Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Arthur Sylvester—have served to increase public skepticism. Yet, to be fair to McNamara and Sylvester, they have served two presidents of widely different personalities, each intensely sensitive about his public image."

People in government are anxious to please the President. They take their cues from him. Max Frankel, reporting from Washington, said, "There are questions here about the haste with which the President's subordinates rush to support what they take to be as the deliberate propaganda line. There are questions about the Administration's use of words to influence opinion at home and abroad. And there are questions about how, after all, it really assesses the course of the war."[11]

A committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors recently accused President Johnson of "consistently trying to make the news sound or seem better than it is."

Pointing particularly to Vietnam, they said, "The war has escalated to the accompaniment of an almost unbroken succession of pronouncements that it was going in the opposite direction, or at least, that something else was happening."[12]

Perhaps the evidence most damaging to the credibility of the government has been the pattern of responding to bids of peace from Hanoi and the National Liberation Front or to pressure for making peace from our allies, neutral nations, the United Nations, or even the government in Saigon by increasing, not reducing, our military action and thus firmly closing the door on the efforts for peace. Thus, in spite of all that our government says about its desire for negotiation, peace talks, and a political settlement, its actions indicate the goal of complete surrender from the other side.

This pattern of escalation whenever peace appears on the horizon is the thesis of *The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam* by Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale Scott and Reginald Zelnik, and a team of specialists in political science and history.[13] They contend that the chief American moves to widen the war from 1963 to 1966 have come at times of particular pressure for negotiation. The gestures of the U.S. Government toward negotiation seem to have preceded, or even cloaked, steps toward large military involvement. Their conclusion is that our government has appeared to regard the possibility of a negotiated solution more as a threat than a promise.[14]

In discussing some of these experiences in which the United States has backed away from negotiations (or bombed the other side out of any interest in negotiation), Richard T. Baker says, "The Administration has been careful to present itself as open to talks without conditions, and to place the onus for non-negotiation on the North Vietnamese. In the broadest sense, given the wary ways of intricate diplomacy, this may not be an untruthful posture. Unhappily, this posture is shaken by revelations that Hanoi has on occasion shown itself receptive to peace overtures."[15]

Baker quotes Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey who said of peace offers in August 1964, "There can be no justification . . . for the subsequent and repeated denials of the highest officials of our Government that any such offer had ever been made."

Whatever all of this means for Vietnam, it also means the erosion of our own institutions. Says Baker, "To be told other stories, however, that bear only a vague resemblance to the facts seems to us to break down the trust between governors and governed, a trust essential to democracy."[16]

And the dreary record is unending. Says Kenneth Crawford, "It is . . . doubtful whether the administration can shake off its reputation for deviousness, especially where the war is concerned, unless it mends its present ways. . . . The Administration is credibility-gap prone."[17]

Peter Arnett in an Associated Press dispatch of Oct. 5, 1967, evaluated the South Vietnamese army. After citing its rate of desertion, corruption, and failure to fight, he said. "The Vietnamese army has failed completely in its mission of overpowering the communist guerrilla movement." Arnett also noted that the enemy

was winning. But at the same time, General Greene said: "The South Vietnamese forces are doing a first-class job." General Westmoreland emphasized their "success against the enemy" while reports show that South Vietnamese losses are less than the American losses.[18]

John A. Lapp notes one of the latest credibility-negotiation blunders which happened earlier this year and came to light late in September: "The most recent conflict over the role of Harry Ashmore and William C. Baggs in their attempt to write a conciliatory letter is a case in point. After visiting Hanoi last January, these distinguished newspapermen helped draft a letter to Ho Chi Minh [in cooperation with the State Department] proposing a cessation of the bombing and secret discussions. However, this February 5 letter was superseded by President Johnson's February 2 letter that set forth more demands before the above could be initiated. While it appears that Ashmore and Baggs thought more highly of their mission than they should have, it is obvious that there is a deliberate 'schizoid' policy emanating from the White House."[19]

Any American, regardless of his stand on Vietnam, must be concerned about the crumbling faith that Americans can place in their government. Says Jack Raymond, "No American government, subject as it is to frequent tests of popular approval, can afford repeated assaults upon its credibility. Yet this is precisely what President Johnson's administration has had to endure with respect to the war in Vietnam, partly at least because a past calculated policy of optimism in public proved unjustified. The consequent skepticism of the official word has lingered and has become further sharpened by the customary government penchant for obfuscation in diplomacy and domestic politics."[20]

But the government is not the only institution under attack. The disease of one member of society may infest other members as well. When the people become suspicious of its government, that suspicion easily passes on to the press that reports on the government.

Clayton Fritchey, *Harpers'* Washington correspondent, says, "All this has had an unexpected side development, for it has raised questions about the credibility of the press as well as of the Administration. The alleged information gap really comes down to discrepancies between press reports and government reports on the progress and nature of the war, and this in turn has focused new attention on the large press corp headquartered in Saigon. . . . And some of the harshest criticism has originated in the Vietnam press camp itself. The President also has reservations about the Vietnam press coverage, especially on political developments."[21]

Says Jack Raymond, "As a consequence, an undercurrent of doubt greets much of the news from Vietnam, official and unofficial. In a war that has engaged the U.S. for more than a decade, with ever-increasing casualties, both press and government face crises in credibility."

Let us admit that apart from credibility that the press has titanic obstacles to face in reporting on the war in Vietnam. Raymond describes one group of problems. "In other wars, a correspondent knew where the likely action was—at the front. He got stories by going there. . . . In this war, not only are there no battle fronts, there are relatively few battles. The insurgency by the Vietcong supported by the North Vietnamese army is designed to harass the people and shake their confidence in government security."

And after the news is collected in Vietnam, getting it printed and read in America may also be a problem. Says Hanson Baldwin, "The Vietnamese war is probably the most complex and difficult war to interpret and present that the American press has ever covered. Yet there are very few editors who are able to allocate the space or the time required for real indepth reporting. Too often the day-by-day reporting is brief, episodic, and partial."[22]

While some correspondents disagree, Malcolm Browne, a free-lance writer who worked the Saigon beat for five years for Associated Press and ABC, feels that no one back home understands the war and that all that the war correspondents have written has not gotten across. He says of his editors, "They're interested only in vignettes, shall we say, a machine gun firing, or a howitzer firing, or some little spectacular short of war, a hospital scene, the traditional Ernie Pyle-World War II reporting. They're not at all interested in the substantive issues, and when they are, they're wrong in their facts. So this is our basic problem, getting across in some way to these people."[23]

Browne cited a Stanford University poll which showed that 71 percent of American people identified the Vietcong as an American ally. It is confusion on a simple fact such as this that causes him to despair of educating the American public on the deeper details of the crisis.

But the confusion about the identity of the enemy is found among the newsmen themselves, or, at least, they sometimes fail to give the proper impression. Raymond Coffey once wrote. "It is perfectly clear that Hanoi is calling the shots for the enemy side" and that "Hanoi could call the whole thing off tomorrow if it wanted to." He even indicated that the North Vietnamese could even make the South Vietnamese guerrillas continue to fight if the North Vietnamese pulled out.[24]

Yet Max Frankel was more correct when he cited unnamed American officials who said they were unable to "judge the degree of Hanoi's influence over the Vietcong. They have judged the influence to be considerable in military terms, but they do not know whether North Vietnam could negotiate an end to hostilities even if it wanted to."[25]

Even where Americans know that the Vietcong (the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam) are the people that the United States is fighting, they tend to think of the North Vietnamese as the major enemy. Press reports tend to leave the impression that Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is the symbol of the resistance who controls everything we oppose.

Fred Sparks, however, reported from Moscow that official representatives of the National Liberation Front were at one time quite depressed because they believed that Ho Chi Minh might conclude an armistice with the U.S. They said, "But we will fight on. Even if Hanoi stops fighting and even if we are once again alone, we will fight on until we are in Saigon."[26]

Says Walter Gormly, "I wonder if this isn't the first time in history that most of the people of a nation have been fooled, during a long war, about the nationality of most of the enemy. People have often been misled about the reasons for wars, but I wonder if the untrammeled news media in the United States are not the first to have misled a people for years about the nationality of an enemy."[27]

Similarly, the government and the press have led the public to believe that the military junta in Vietnam was legitimized by the September 3 presidential elections. But the irregularities in the election which brought only 35 percent of the votes to the winning Thieu-Ky regime were so great that the official investigating committee of the South Vietnamese Assembly recommended nullification of the election. David Wurfel, a specialist in Southeast Asia from the University of Missouri, spent four weeks observing the South Vietnamese election and discovered that the elections were not free. The Vietnamese people do not regard the elections as legitimate and the report of the official American observers whitewashing the election has infuriated them. Among the irregularities that Wurfel listed were the elimination of the most popular presidential candidates before the election campaign even began, press censorship during the campaign even after promises to free the press, terrorism by the government, the manufacture of votes without voters, duplicate voting by the military, and American pressure.[28]

Realizing that the problems of news coverage and interpretation in the Vietnam crisis are inherently great, we must conclude that the press is as Arthur Sylvester in his unguarded moments wished it to be, the handmaiden of government.

With some exceptions and in spite of differences of opinion within the press, the press has tended to serve the immediate interests of the military policy of the United States in Vietnam.[29] The press has become the unwitting and sometimes unwilling extension of American power.

This does not imply censorship of the news or something so crass as reporters rewriting official information releases. The media's understanding of its place in American life, its relationship to its audience and its advertisers, and its relationship to the power structure of American society have all shaped its reporting and interpretation.

Vietnam is being understood as a military struggle, not just because the government seems to see it that way, but because the press cannot or will not report it any differently.

In a recent review of the press coverage of Vietnam, *Newsweek* gave the press a generally good score though admitting room for improvement. The report cited Roger Grimsby of KGO, San Francisco, saying, "There are almost no correspondents who speak Vietnamese or who are really up on the political situation. The military are very cooperative and will take you anywhere. So the military angle wins out."[30]

This confirms the findings of two reporters for two campus newspapers who spent three months in South Vietnam for the *Oberlin Review* and the *Boston University News*. Alexander Jack and Dalton Shipway found that few reporters ever seek an unofficial view of events by talking to Vietnamese not aligned with the government and those actively opposed to it. These people, of course, are difficult to contact and usually unwilling to talk. "Except for a handful of Americans, usually representatives of U.S. peace groups, the academic and religious communities in Saigon simply will not talk to American journalists. At the University of Saigon, for instance, Vietnamese students are particularly suspicious of the New York *Times* and CBS-TV."[31]

One of the practical problems is that most journalists must use translators supplied by the Vietnamese Government. The translator is either a government spy or suspected to be one. "To interview a Vietnamese through an interpreter or even in the presence of his friends is analogous to interviewing a black man in the presence of a white sheriff in the American South: 'We sure love our government. Things were peaceful until outside agitators from the North came.' "

Thus it is often impossible for the reporter to discover anything other than the official line. There is no censorship or conspiracy on the part of the U.S. Embassy or military command to hide the truth or manage the news. The very physical presence of an American is enough to end any meaningful conversation before it even begins.

Jack and Shipway relate their own problems in making contact. "As students representing radical anti-war newspapers, we achieved rapport only after strenuous effort. Often we would talk with Vietnamese four or five times before they abandoned their initial pro-war stance and revealed how truthfully they hated American involvement, how most South Vietnamese except war profiteers sympathize with the NLF, how the U.S. was committing atrocities worse than the French, and how they would fight until the last Vietnamese unless the Americans withdrew."

Most American correspondents live with the military on installations "that resemble a microcosm of Southern California. Whether in the rice paddies of the Delta, the Montagnard forests, or hilly I Corps by the DMZ, the bases have swimming pools, tennis courts, paneled bars, live music piped in from the States, and resident civic action projects and smiling Vietnamese nationals. . . . The American reporter, like the soldier, has his criticism of the war—often strong ones but he cannot conceivably comprehend the horror that is going on outside the American installations."

Richard West, correspondent for London's *New Statesman* wrote his observations of the work of U.S. correspondents in South Vietnam that confirms the observations of these student reporters. The title of West's article is perhaps all that I need to quote: "The Captive U.S. Journalists."[32]

Senator Fulbright once observed that most newspapers in the U.S. had become "servile" to the government and that they seemed "bloodthirsty" about the Vietnam war.[33] I must admit that I get the bloodthirsty feeling quite often after listening and viewing ABC's *Peter Jennings and the News*, for example.

Perhap's a healthy and independent press could not have diverted the government and the military-industrial complex from its fixed course in Vietnam and in Asia. We're not sure what a non-handmaiden press could do because we may never have seen one. But we know that there is enough evidence to indicate that the press has done what any good handmaiden would have done—it has aided and abetted the United States Government in its aggression in Asia.

Harry S. Ashmore, formerly editor of the Arkansas *Gazette* and now chairman of the executive committee of the Fund for the Republic and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, recently reviewed his experience with the media in relation to the two *Pacem in Terris* Convocations. "The fateful question now may be whether the communications media will continue to serve as no more than a cave wall upon which distorted shadows are cast. . . . This, surely suits the President's convenience as he lumps the draft card burners together with the thoughtful men who have urged not withdrawal but negotiation in Vietnam, contemptuously labels the whole lot 'intellectuals,' and charges that it is largely made up of 'Nervous Nellies who will turn on their leaders and on their country and on their fighting men.' As the media continue to lend themselves to this simplistic game and add their own distortions in the name of human interest, it becomes increasingly difficult to focus public attention upon any complex public issue."[34]

It is not encouraging to know that the communications media are the handmaidens of government. But what else did we expect? They have been handmaidens of the business community for as long as we can remember. It wasn't a newspaper, but Ralph Nader who told us that our automobiles are unsafe to drive and have been for a long time.[35]

But how do you rehabilitate a busted handmaiden? The problems of a free and independent press would seem to be a concern quite distant from our concern for Vietnam. Yet the failure of America in Vietnam may well be the failure of its institutions at home. The institutions of government, particularly the Presidency and the Congress have not been able to work together and check each other. The academic community may have also failed to make its contribution. And we could well inveigh against the military-industrial complex.

But the failure may be the failure of the electorate, the foundation of our society. If so, the failure may well lie with the institutions that inform and nurture any society: its churches, its schools, and its press.

We have only examined the press in this study. To have made a diagnosis is probably enough. To be aware of our illness is in itself sometimes a major achievement. We will have to make the cure the project of another venture. Edward Engberg calls for the professionalization of journalists as one step so that journalists might operate independently of the business community that prints a newspaper or operates a television station.[36]

Senator Estes Kefauver in speaking to the Associated Church Press meeting in Nashville in 1963 suggested that the religious press might well serve as the voice of dissent in a society where the so-called secular press is under restraint as the voice of consensus. I have tried to evaluate this possibility and would hope that it is an option. But the religious press is often an invisible press and whether it is making an impact is hard to determine. We know that in some situations it is serving as a conscience and if the uneasiness of conscience that all of us feel has some roots in the religious press, I would be encouraged.[37]

But the press has failed us and we and the Vietnamese people are the losers.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Man in the News," Aug. 31, 1966, p. 4.
2. Morley Safer, "Television Covers the War," *Dateline* 1966, an annual publication of the Overseas Press Club, an excerpt of which was published in *Christianity and Crisis*, June 27, 1966, p. 140.
3. Martin Gershen, "The 'Right to Lie,'" *Columbia Journalism Review*, Winter 1966/67, pp. 14-16. In a later clarification to the author of the *Review* article, Sylvester said, "The Government has no right to lie to save itself politically or otherwise. But to protect its own people? Yes."
4. E. W. Kenworthy, "Sylvester Faces Senators Today," New York *Times*, Aug. 31, 1966, p. 4.
5. New York *Times*, Sept. 1, 1966, p. 7.
6. Kenworthy, *op. cit.*
7. "Credibility and the Democratic Process," *Christian Living*, Dec. 1967, p. 18.
8. "Salinger Tells How Kennedy Tried to Hide Vietnam Build-up," *U.S. News and World Report*, Sept. 12, 1966, a review of Salinger's book, *With Kennedy*. The review also quotes Assistant Secretary of State Robert Manning as once saying, "The problem is complicated by the long-standing desire of the U.S. Government to see the American involvement in Vietnam minimized, even represented as something less in reality than it is."
9. Quoted in Jack Raymond, "It's a Dirty War for Correspondents, Too," New York *Times Magazine*, Feb. 13, 1966.

10. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Information War in Saigon," *The Reporter*, Feb. 26, 1966, pp. 29-31.
11. "Up and Down on Vietnam," New York *Times*, July 20, 1966, p. 2.
12. "Editors Criticize Johnson's News Policy But Back War Decisions," New York *Times*, Apr. 21, 1967, p. 22.
13. Published by Fawcett World Library, New York, 1966.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
15. "Integrity in the Public Debate," *Christianity and Crisis*, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 2. Baker is a member of the paper's editorial board.
16. Further comments on the pattern of deception in escalation appear in "Danger of Global War Grows with Escalation" by John M. Swomley, Jr., in *The Mennonite*, June 6, 1967.
17. *Newsweek*, Sept. 25, 1967, p. 39.
18. Cited by John A. Lapp, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
20. Raymond, *op. cit.*
21. Clayton Fritchey, "Are We Being Told the Truth About Vietnam?" *Harpers*, March 1967, pp. 121-22.
22. Much the same statement is made by Raymond: "interpretive pieces are sacrificed to the hard-hitting day's developments. The diet of 'straight news' and 'color stories,' unleavened by interpretive background for this most complicated of modern wars, is inadequate for a real understanding of what is going on."
23. "Are We Getting Through?" *Columbia Journalism Review*, Fall, 1966, p. 41.
24. Chicago *Daily News*, Nov. 15, 1966.
25. New York *Times*, Jan. 1, 1966.
26. *World Journal Tribune*, Mar. 1, 1967.
27. *Newsman's Gadfly*, Box 26, Mt. Vernon, Iowa 52314, edited by Walter Gormly (July 6, 1967). The three previous citations were also given in this source and in the issue of Dec. 9, 1966. For further comments by Gormly see *The Mennonite*, Feb. 15, 1966, p. 113; Apr. 12, 1966, p. 250; July 5, 1966, p. 448; Oct. 4, 1966, p. 598.
28. "Fraud in Vietnam Election—Anti-Americanism Rises," *The Mennonite*, Oct. 31, 1967, pp. 659-61.
29. We note some evidence that might seem to qualify this statement. Clayton Fritchey, in his *Harpers* article, said, "But in Saigon today, the American correspondents are divided in precisely the same way as the American people." The reporting of Morley Safer for CBS might be noted for its anti-war content. He is now assigned to London. And a number of publications and at least one television station are opposing the war. Robert Elegant, writing in the Los Angeles *Times of* Nov. 5, 1967, laments the "alienation between the government and the press," and the "tendency of the mass media to become advocates—on either side—rather than reporters or analysts, has further clouded the picture of Vietnam in the minds of many Americans."
30. "The Press: Room for Improvement," July 10, 1967.
31. Alexander Jack and Dalton Shipway, "U.S. Press Fundamentally Ignorant About War." Jack is a philosophy major at Oberlin and Shipway is a graduate student in international relations at Boston University.
32. The *New Statesman*, Sept. 23, 1966, reprinted in Atlas, Dec. 1966, pp. 23-24.
33. Associated Press dispatch in the New York *Times*, Oct. 3, 1966, p. 8.
34. Harry S. Ashmore, "The Public Relations of Peace," *The Center Magazine*, Oct.-Nov. 1967, p. 68.
35. The *Wall Street Journal* on July 25, 1967, in "Ethics and the Press," wrote: "There is evidence that many once-principled newsmen have been deeply demoralized by their papers' surrender to advertisers' interests. A recent survey of 162 business and financial editors, for example, revealed that 22.6 percent of them 'indicated that as a matter of routine they were compelled to puff up or alter and downgrade business stories at the request of advertisers' . . . . Prof. Timothy Hubbard of the University of Missouri, who conducted the survey, says many editors object strenuously to such attempts at distortion but often lack backing from higher management. 'As a result,' he says, 'some seem curiously resigned to trimming their editorial sails to the edicts of the ad department, particularly on smaller dailies.' "
36. "A professional association of journalists, offering strength of conviction and mutual protection, would appear to be the most effective form of accountability that might be devised." " 'A Free and Reasonable Press': Where Are They Now?" *The Center Magazine*, Oct.-Nov. 1967, p. 101.
37. J. Lorne Peachey in his article "Protestant Magazine Editorials and the Vietnam War" in *Copy Log*, the publication of the Associated Church Press for April 1967, reports on a random study of fifteen Protestant publications. He discovered that 64 out of a total of 1,103 editorials had discussed Vietnam (5.8 percent) and that the majority of the editorials dissented on Vietnam. One of his conclusions: "The charge that Protestant magazine editorials do not speak out on controversial issues is generally true."

BOOKS IN REVIEW

John Harold Redekop, *The American Far Right*: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1968, 232 pp.

What is the liberal American historian or political scientist to do with the political phenomenon known as the "Far Right?" Past interpretations of the ultra-conservative wing too often held it up to wholesale condemnation or ridicule. Two works that come to mind, Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, *The Strange Tactics of Extremism* (New York: Worton, 1964) and Ralph Lord Roy, *Apostles of Discord* (Boston: Beacon, 1953), illustrate the general tendency to view the Far Right as something totally outside of the American tradition, hopelessly isolated in an atmosphere of hate, fascism, nativism, and paranoia.

For this reason, J. H. Redekop's book is most welcome. Beginning with a comprehensive analysis of Billy James Hargis, a major contemporary spokesman for the Far Right and founder of the Christian Crusade, the author describes the crusader's religious and political thought in a dispassionate, analytical way. Steeped in a fusion of fundamental Christianity and fundamental patriotic Americanism, Hargis sees America as a "Christian" nation, ever "led by the Spirit of the Living God." His Christian Crusade is dedicated to exposing "the twin dangers of Communism and/or socialism and religious apostasy." Various aspects of Hargis' thought—Communism and the Soviet Union, the United Nations, and his philosophy of government—are covered by Redekop as he describes the mind set of the founder of Christian Crusade.

Then, instead of denouncing Hargis and the Far Right for not fitting into the American liberal democratic world, the author seeks to place him within the American tradition, thus making an honest attempt to understand Hargis. Redekop recognizes the role of conservatism in American evolution; he demolishes the notion that "America was born a liberal nation," that all "the founders of America were liberals." The author also places Hargis into an American tradition that has long attempted to fuse fundamental Christianity with nationalism. Most significantly, the author discusses a deeply rooted tradition of bigotry and intolerance in America. From the zealous Puritans of colonial America to the Know-Nothings of the 1850's and the various intolerant groups which sprang up during the Civil War and

the Depression days, America developed a minority tradition of "bigotry, prejudice, and intolerance, including Main Street vigilantism, religious suppression, and with burning . . . ."

In his analysis of America's Far Right, Redekop has produced a valuable work. He clearly sees the danger of the Far Right with its "distorted perceptions, the misleading simplifications, the thwarting of social progress by labelling all social action as Communist-inspired, and the dangerous practice of transplanting final, total answers, from the private, religious sphere to the public, political sphere."

But in addition, Redekop sees another threat. A majority of scholars have revealed an "amazing degree of carelessness when reacting to the Far Right. The very principles they claim to be defending have all too frequently been jettisoned in their own analyses." More information and analysis is needed, but Redekop's *The American Far Right* has helped to narrow the gap.

BETHEL COLLEGE — *John Waltner*

Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*. Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York, 1967.

This book is another memoir from the experience of men knowledgeable in the inner affairs of the foreign policy decisions of the Kennedy administration. As such it has much bearing on policy toward Vietnam prior to the escalation. Hilsman served with Kennedy as head of intelligence in the State Department and Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East. He came to this position after experience in organizing guerrilla warfare in Burma during World War II, although he is a political scientist by profession. As far as Vietnam is concerned it seems quite apparent that the ingredients needed to reconstitute a viable South Vietnamese nationalism through a pacification program or its equivalent never lay within American capacity to provide although Hilsman had ideas about how it might have been done.

We were no less remote from reality at this point than Secretary McNamara as he charted the progress of the war through "efficiency factors," measuring minute computer-derived components based upon irrelevant or erroneous data provided from unreliable or indifferent sources, often South Vietnamese. The role of Secretary Rusk in foreign policy remains cloudy to this reviewer. Lyndon Johnson, as vice-president, participated in National Security Council sessions but never strayed far from the viewpoints and perspectives of the Department of Defense. Interestingly enough in view of recent State Department positions no major concern for the threat of Mainland China is reflected in these policy decisions.

BETHEL COLLEGE — *J. Lloyd Spaulding*

Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power*, The Viking Press, 1967.

This study by Draper is an analysis of American proclivity to find itself committed to support the reactionary forces in the world least consistent with the liberal democratic values of the American Revolution. Draper documents his thesis in the case of Cuba and the Dominican Republic. But the major thrust of his work lies in his analysis of the same tendency to support the "mandarins" of Saigon against the nationalism of the Vietnamese as well as the general revolution of rising expectations all across the nation. However, one might choose to criticize Draper's analysis, the thesis is annoying and uncomfortable. Why should he be so close to accuracy in his diagnosis? What does this mean for our role in the balance of Asia, Africa and Latin America? How well do our builders of power understand their limitations?

BETHEL COLLEGE — *J. Lloyd Spaulding*

Committee on Social Issues. *Psychiatric Aspects of the Prevention of Nuclear War* published by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. 1964, pp. 317, $1.50.

The Preamble to the Constitution of UNESCO states, "Wars begin in the minds of men."

This report is dedicated to examining the psychological factors that contribute to the UNESCO preamble being true. Although the articles in this report are not individually authored the Committee on Social Issues includes such prominent psychiatrists as Jerome Frank, Judd Marmor, Portia Bell Hume, and Roy Menninger. This report was developed in an effort to better understand the psychological reasons for the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. In general the report discusses the socio-psychological factors bearing on the problem of war and peace in our nuclear age. The data presented is of particular interest and value in looking at the present Vietnam conflict.

Among many psychological factors outlined in the report several are referred to here as illustrative. In the past, one school of thought held it was man's aggressive impulses that instinctively led to wars and international conflict. This report suggests that the psychological effects of "fear" play as great if not greater roles than aggressive impulses in one nation's conflict with another. When fear of another country or system is generated and promoted the other nation is gradually seen as the "enemy." When fears of the enemy are intensified by inflammatory propaganda, tension in the populace as well as in the leadership rises to unbearable heights. Under this kind of stress any course of action often seems better than none. The cry is heard for "action" and "let's get it over with," even though such action may be self-defeating and even self-destructive. The immediate action of war may somehow appear more endurable than the uncertain risks of peace.

Another reason for international conflict, according to this report, is the tendency to view other individuals or the "enemy" as though they do not quite belong to the human race. Since such people are presumed vicious or bad, one is exempted from feelings of guilt or shame if he withholds considerations or restraints ordinarily exercised toward human beings. This kind of dehumanization process makes it possible to see these "non-humans" as mere items or statistics. This carries with it a kind of noninvolvement making it possible to write off suffering, misery, sickness, or death of the enemy as something not to be concerned with personally but to be aware of only statistically. It is pointed out this dehumanization process is strengthened with the push-button kind of warfare now possible where awareness of destruction caused by one's act (pushing the button) is less personal. Another important concept dealt with in

the report is that of one's tendency to distort the perception of another's intention. This mutual distrust tends to provoke the very kind of behavior we are most afraid of so that the mutual expectation that the other side really does not want peace and cannot be trusted tends to become self-fulfilling.

In addition to dealing with the above and other psychological factors contributing to war the report deals with the psychological implications of deterrence, civil defense, and nonviolence. In summary the plea is made that since war begins in the minds of men, the minds of men must also be capable of ending war.

NEWTON, KANSAS *Merrill Raber*

Helmut Gollwitzer, *Vietnam, Israel und die Christenheit.* München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1967, 103 pp.

Helmut Gollwitzer has a long record of theological, social, and political concern. Theologically he is related to Karl Barth and for a while he was slated to succeed him in Basel. Having spent considerable time in Russia as a prisoner of war and in Berlin as professor of the university, he has had opportunity to see the rise of the American supported West Germany and the Moscow orientated East Germany.

In this booklet he reviews with the keen sense of observation the explosive areas of Vietnam and Israel in which East and West meet not around tables of negotiation but at the traditional battlefields by the use of modern weapons of warfare.

The first part of the booklet deals with "Vietnam and Christendom" in which the author cites numerous voices of those involved in war as well as the "observers" from both sides. He states that Germany, including the church, up till recently has been siding with the "hawks" of America. He observes that there is now a noticeable change. Gollwitzer is outspoken in pointing out the weakness of the American effort in trying to continue policies of the colonial era. He draws parallels between the ambitions of Germany under Hitler and the American efforts in our day.

The second part of the book deals with "Israel and the Arabs." The author claims that the problem is that the opponents are not willing to consider various points of view. Gollwitzer has visited both the Arabs as well as Israel. He found great differences between the citizens of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Most, however, agree that "the crime of Israel" must be obliterated, which means that next time it must be wiped off the map. The author suggests four "corrections."

First of all, it is wrong to maintain that there ever has been an Arab state which was destroyed by Zionism, and which now must be restituted. In the total history of Palestine there has never been a state that was completely independent except the Jewish state. Secondly, the author claims that not all Arab refugees were expelled; some chose to flee. Thirdly, Israel is not necessarily expansionist. Fourthly, it is not correct to state that Israel is a creation and tool of Western imperialism. The author maintains that Zionism created Israel in 1948 against the wish of England with the help of the Soviet Union. He admits, however, that the Zionist movement made use of imperialist help.

Gollwitzer suggests that the cease-fire must be transformed into an actual peace. In order to achieve this those involved must be willing to reconsider a number of questions and views. Even voices in Israel claim that Israel cannot remain a "western foreign element" in the Middle East, and that it must develop a sense of neighborliness within the Arab world.

BETHEL COLLEGE *Cornelius Krahn*

A New China Policy: Quaker proposals by the American Friends Service Committee. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. 68.

Peace in Vietnam: A New Approach in Southeast Asia by the American Friends Service Committee. New York: Hill and Wang, 1966. Pp. 112. Paper, $0.95; cloth, $3.00.

Some of the readers of the paper (The *Mennonite*) that I edit tell me that we publish too much about Vietnam. I can only agree with them. We do publish too much. And Vietnam is too much with us. But while it is such a large fact in our world, we will have to meet it and deal with it.

Our weakness in dealing with Vietnam is not that we hear too much about it. Rather, we really know too little about it. The American Friends Service Committee has produced two books that will be a great help to us, especially, *Peace in Vietnam.*

United States relations with China are in a state of near-war or undeclared war. Hostile American acts as seen by the Chinese include our support of the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, our failure to recognize China as the legitimate government on the mainland, and, of course, our action in Vietnam.

Proposals for easing the situation show little likelihood of being followed. The Quakers call for an end of American isolation of China and resumption of trade. "Two of the largest and most powerful nations of the world have since 1950 lived largely in isolated ignorance of one another and in an atmosphere of mutual fear and hate," say the writers of *A New China Policy.* "Even if we must act alone in taking first steps toward a more rational relationship, the present situation is dangerously alienated from reality and must not be allowed to continue."

And Vietnam is equally urgent, both as it relates to the China problem and to world peace. *Peace in Vietnam,* though written shortly after the close of 1965 and now over two years old, contains more basic background on this complex crisis than can be found in such a short space anywhere. The appendixes include the text of the 1954 Geneva Agreements plus a number of other valuable documents related to the struggle such as the Program of the National Liberation Front.

The proposals made for a settlement have been made before: reconvene a Geneva-type conference, de-escalation, recognition of the National Liberation Front, international supervision of a cease-fire, phased withdrawal, and neutralization of Vietnam. But they deserve to be made again and discussed again.

So much of the solution of the Vietnam war waits on the attitudes of American citizens. The Quaker books may change some of these attitudes.

NEWTON, KANSAS *Maynard Shelly*

From Colonialism to Communism, A Case History of North Vietnam by Hoang Van Chi, New York: Praeger, 1964.

Hoang Van Chi is a refugee scholar from North Vietnam who now lives in Paris. His book presents the revolution, which occurred in North Vietnam from 1945 through the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and in the period after the division of the country under terms of the Geneva Accords. The story would leave no doubt that this event belongs to the same family of violent revolutions attacking property which were observed in Russia in 1917 and Mainland China in 1949 and after. The plight of dedicated Vietnamese nationalists of the north who hoped that the ideologists of Mao could be reserved in the new government gives little comfort to those who argue for a successful coalition government of the National Liberation Front in the South.

The revolutionary tactics utilized in a blundering and brutal land reform effort borrowed from Mao, as well as fear of religious persecution, easily explain the migration of refugees to the south after the settlement at Geneva.

This study is the only history of this revolution which has come to this reviewer's attention. The forces of Ho Chi Minh should not be looked upon as the tools of the Mainland Chinese, but they viewed Mao as their mentor in revolutionary strategy and tactics. No thinker on the problems of South Vietnam should neglect this report.

BETHEL COLLEGE *J. Lloyd Spaulding*

VIETNAM: *Crisis of Conscience* by Robert Meafee Brown, Abraham J. Heschel and Michael Naraks. New York Association press, Hehrman Hause; Herder and Herder, 1967, 127 pages (paperback).

These essays of analysis and moral scrutinizing of the war in Vietnam attempt to rally the conscience of the three major religious groups in the United States against the violence in Vietnam. These thinkers have not eschewed violence as an instrument of national policy. Hence the arguments marshalled against this war are of interest to ethicists and political thinkers alike. From their frame of reference so much depends upon what interpreters hold to be the essential causal forces at work in the Vietnamese social situation. At what cost is the limited and restrained violence to be utilized to keep the country from falling to the hands of a Communism inherently nationalist? What is a realistic appraisal of the potential of the limited, controlled violence practiced in South Vietnam to achieve certain political objectives? What risk of all-out nuclear war is worthwhile courting? Is there any national purpose achievable? These issues are debated in a very antiwar frame of reference. Here is the case for the proposition that this war is "different." And maybe it is, but it is not even a war, except in fact.

BETHEL COLLEGE *J. Lloyd Spaulding*

Behind the Scenes—Hanoi, December 23, 1966—January 7, 1967 by Harrison E. Salisbury; Harper and Row, New York, 243 pages (paperback).

This story is the account of Salisbury's trip to Hanoi somewhat over a year ago. Future historians, if any are around, may be able to decide whether this trip marks another partial manifestation of readiness to talk to the United States on the part of Hanoi, or another random event in the vast sweep of political affairs moving swiftly to no predictable end. Salisbury is a veteran foreign reporter and editor for the *New York Times,* and by no means an inexperienced observer nor unsophisticated interpreter of nations at war.

Chronicles of war sadden one with their violence, irrationality and suffering of innocent victims of social situations not of their own making. The high morale of the civilians of Hanoi is a perplexing fact reported by Salisbury, perhaps better understood since the recent Tet uprising than before. Although this narrative describes a situation that is but a snapshot of prologue to the present, the story is worth reading, interpret Salisbury's observations as you will. Here is a generation of Asians willing to achieve martyrdom in behalf of a social system repugnant to us and we seem increasingly willing to afford them this opportunity. Salisbury seems to make a case for North Vietnamese aspirations for independence from Mainland China and the Soviet Union. His report even creates a doubt of Hanoi domination of a government of the National Liberation Front in the South, an hypothesis most Americans would find completely untenable, particularly among "domino theorists."

BETHEL COLLEGE *J. Lloyd Spaulding*

BOOKS AVAILABLE

William Klassen, *Covenant and Community.* The Life, Writings and Hermeneutics of Pilgram Marpeck, 1968. $4.95

C. Henry Smith, *Mennonite Country Boy.* The Early Years of C. Henry Smith, 1962. $4.00

Cornelius J. Dyck, (ed.) *A Legacy of Faith.* The Heritage of Menno Simons, 1962. $5.50

Rollin Stely Armour, *Anabaptist Baptism:* A Representative Study, 1966. $6.75

The Challenge of the Child. Pathway Publishing Corporation, 1967. $3.50

John W. Bennett, *Hutterian Brethren.* 1967. $8.00

Cornelius Krahn, *Dutch Anabaptism* (1450-1600) $9.50

John B. Toews, *Lost Fatherland.* The Story of the Mennonite Emigration from Soviet Russia, 1921-1927. 1967. $6.95

Cornelius J. Dyck, (ed.), *The Witness of the Holy Spirit,* 1967. (Menn. World Conference, Amsterdam). $6.00

Frank H. Epp, *Mennonite Exodus,* 1962. (Russia). $6.00

Christian Krehbiel, *Prairie Pioneer,* 1961. $3.50

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